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Non-interference guarantees the absence of illicit information flow throughout program
execution. It can be enforced by appropriate information flow type systems. Much of
previous work on type systems for non-interference has focused on calculi or high-level
programming languages, and existing type systems for low-level languages typically omit
objects, exceptions, and method calls. We define an information flow type system for a
sequential JVM-like language that includes all these programming features, and we
prove, in the Coq proof assistant, that it guarantees non-interference. An additional
benefit of the formalization is that we have extracted from our proof a certified
lightweight bytecode verifier for information flow. Our work provides, to our best
knowledge, the first sound and certified information flow type system for such an
expressive fragment of the JVM.
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1. Introduction
The Java security architecture combines static and dynamic mechanisms to ensure that
applications are not harmful to other applications or to the runtime environment. In
particular, a bytecode verifier statically guarantees that a program is safe, i.e. does not
perform arithmetic on references, overflows the stack, or jumps to protected memory
locations. A stack inspection mechanism dynamically performs access control verifica-
tions. However, the Java security architecture lacks appropriate mechanisms to guaran-
tee stronger confidentiality properties: for example, it has been suggested that the Java
security model is not sufficient in security-sensitive applications such as smart cards (Gi-
rard, 1999; Montgomery and Krishna, 1999). One weakness of the model is that it only
concentrates on who accesses sensitive information, but not how sensitive information
flows through programs.
The goal of language-based security (Sabelfeld and Myers, 2003) is to provide enforce-
ment mechanisms for end-to-end security policies that go beyond the basic isolation prop-
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erties ensured by security models for mobile code. In contrast to security models based
on access control, language-based security focuses on information-flow policies that track
how sensitive information is propagated during execution.
Starting from the seminal work of Volpano and Smith (Volpano and Smith, 1997), type
systems have become a prominent approach for a practical enforcement of information
flow policies, and type-based enforcement mechanisms have been developed for advanced
programming features such as exceptions, objects (Banerjee and Naumann, 2005), in-
teractions (O’Neill et al., 2006), concurrency (Volpano and Smith, 1998) and distribu-
tion (Mantel and Sabelfeld, 2003). In parallel to these fundamental studies, there have
been efforts to design and implement information flow type systems for fully-fledged pro-
gramming languages such as Java (Myers, 1999) and Caml (Pottier and Simonet, 2003).
One leading effort towards the development of information-flow aware programming lan-
guage is Jif (Myers, 1999), which builds upon the decentralized label model and offers a
flexible and expressive framework to define information flow policies for Java programs.
The central contribution of this paper is the definition and the proof of soundness of
an information flow type system for a significant subset of (sequential) Java bytecode
programs including objects, arrays, methods, and exceptions—but excluding e.g. initial-
ization, multi-threading, and garbage collection. The type system builds upon previous
works by the authors (Barthe et al., 2004; Barthe and Rezk, 2005) which propose a
sound information flow type system for a simple assembly language that closely resem-
bles the JVMI fragment of this paper, and an object-oriented language that resembles
the JVMO fragment of this paper—extended with a simplified treatment of exceptions.
This paper adopts many of the ideas and techniques of (Barthe and Rezk, 2005), but also
improves substantially over it in terms of language coverage, precision of the analysis,
and expressiveness of the policy:
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— language coverage: we provide a treatment of exceptions that is close to Java, and
include methods and arrays;
— precision of the analysis: we rely on a refined notion of control dependence region
that provides a fine-grained treatment of exceptions and make the analysis able to
communicate with preliminary analyses to reduce the control flow graph of applica-
tions,
— policy expressiveness: we adopt arbitrary lattices of security levels instead of two-
element lattices.
While these issues have been addressed previously in isolation, their combination yields
significant complexity in soundness proofs, making it necessary to machine-check proofs
rather than using pen-and-paper arguments. A second contribution of our work is a
formalization in the Coq proof assistant of a lightweight information flow verifier that
checks whether a program is typable according to our type system. The verifier is com-
patible with the Java architecture and operates in the fashion of lightweight bytecode
verification, i.e. it takes a JVM program with security annotations (and some additional
information on the control dependence regions of programs), and checks that the program
respects the security policy purported by the annotations.
Contents of the paper We begin with an overview of related work in Section 2. Then, we
analyze in turn increasingly complex fragments of the JVM:
— the machine JVMI , studied in Section 3, includes basic operations to manipulate
operand stacks as well as conditional and unconditional jumps, and is expressive
enough for compiling programs written in a simple imperative language. In this sec-
tion, we define and discuss operand stack indistinguishability. The definitions and
type system for JVMI are adapted from our earlier work (Barthe et al., 2004);
— the machine JVMO, studied in Section 4, is an object-oriented extension of JVMI
which includes features such as dynamic object creation, instance field accesses and
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updates, arrays and is expressive enough for compiling intra-procedural statements
from (Banerjee and Naumann, 2005). In this section, we define and discuss heap
indistinguishability. The main difficulty is to propose a sufficiently fine type system
which allows public arrays to handle secret information.
— JVMC , studied in Section 5, is a procedural extension of JVMO with method calls,
and is expressive enough to compile the language of (Banerjee and Naumann, 2005).
The main difficulty is to handle information leakages caused by dynamic method
dispatch;
— JVME , studied in Section 6, extends JVMC with exceptions. The main difficulty is to
handle information leakages caused by exceptions, especially when they escape the
scope of the method in which they are raised.
For each fragment, we shall define the syntax and semantics of programs; formulate the
security policy and the typing rules; and finally prove soundness of the type system.
Section 7 provides additional details on the formal proof developed in Coq.
This paper supersedes (Barthe et al., 2007). The main differences are the incremental
presentation of different language fragments, the longer account of the machine-checked
formalization, and the addition of several examples.
Notations and conventions For every function f ∈ A → B, x ∈ A and v ∈ B, we let
f ⊕{x 7→ v} denote the unique function f ′ s.t. f ′(y) = f(y) if y 6= x and f ′(x) = v.
Further, we let A⋆ denote the set of A-stacks for every set A. We use hd and tl and ::
and ++ to denote the head and tail and cons and concatenation operations on stacks.
For simplicity, examples throughout the paper take as partial order of security levels
S = {L,H} with L ≤ H , where H is the high level for confidential data, and L is the
low level for observable data.
Finally, we also make the assumption that all methods return a result; this is a harm-
less departure from Java, which allows us to avoid duplicating many definitions. This
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assumption is done here for the sake of presentation, but the formal proofs do consider
both the cases of methods returning a result, and methods returning no result.
2. Related work
2.1. Prior work
In order to realize our goal of defining a sound information flow type system for (sequen-
tial) Java bytecode, we draw influences from several earlier works that address its features
in isolation. For example, our approach to deal with unstructured code is inspired from
Kobayashi and Shirane (Kobayashi and Shirane, 2002), who defined the first informa-
tion flow type system for a low level language for a subset of the JVM similar to the
JVMI machine defined in Section 3. We adopt from their type system the use of: i) con-
trol dependence regions; ii) security environments. Similar concepts arise in the work
of Agat (Agat, 2000), who studied the possibility of eliminating timing leaks through
program transformations. For example, Agat uses control dependence regions (which he
calls contexts) to detect the instructions whose timing behavior may leak information.
Many ideas of the type system originate from Jif (Myers, 1999), an information-flow
aware extension of Java that builds on the decentralized label model. Our type system
adopts from this work: i) the form of method signatures, ii) the use of pre-analyses to
reduce the control flow graph, iii) the ability of public arrays to handle secret information.
Jif supports a rich set of mechanisms for specifying and enforcing expressive and flexible
security policies. The richness of the Jif type system also makes it difficult to prove
soundness—and there is no fully formal description of the type system.
Banerjee and Naumann (Banerjee and Naumann, 2005) develop a provably sound
information flow type system for a fragment of Java with objects and methods. Our type
system adopts from (Banerjee and Naumann, 2005): i) the focus on a simpler type system
that does not support declassification policies nor label polymorphism, ii) the definition
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of heap equivalence, iii) the typing rules for method invocations. Their type system is
simpler than ours since they omit language features such as exceptions and arrays.
2.2. Companion works
A companion work (Barthe et al., 2006) establishes a formal correspondence between
the source type systems of (Banerjee and Naumann, 2005) and ours, in the form of
a type-preservation result, showing that the compiler maps typable Java programs to
typable bytecode programs. As a result, our certified verifier can be used to deploy in
a Foundational Proof Carrying Code architecture any program that type-checks in an
extension of the type system of (Banerjee and Naumann, 2005) to exceptions. Section 8
also discusses briefly works towards extending our type system to multi-threading (Barthe
et al., 2010; Barthe and Rivas, 2011) and declassification (Barthe et al., 2008).
2.3. Other related work
This section provides a short summary of other related work. A more detailed account
appears in the third author’s thesis (Rezk, 2006).
Java A hypothesis of the works of (Myers, 1999; Banerjee and Naumann, 2005) and of
this paper is a semantics in which references are opaque, i.e. the only observations that
can be made about a reference are those about the object to which it points. Hedin
and Sands (Hedin and Sands, 2006) observed that implementations of the Java Virtual
Machine commonly violate this assumption, and that allow references to be cast to an
integer; moreover, they exhibited a typable Jif program that does not use declassification
but leaks information through invoking API methods. Their attack relies on the assump-
tion that the function that allocates new objects on the heap is deterministic; however,
this assumption is perfectly reasonable and satisfied by many implementations of the
JVM. In addition to demonstrating the attack, Hedin and Sands show how a refined
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information flow type system can thwart such attacks for a language that allows one
to cast references as integers. Intuitively, their type system tracks the security level of
references as well as the security levels of the fields of the object its points to.
Information flow has close connections with slicing and dependence analyses (Abadi
et al., 1999), and it is possible to adapt methods from this field to analyze the security
of programs. For example, Hammer, Krinke and Snelting (Hammer et al., 2006) have
developed an automatic and flow-sensitive information flow analysis for Java based on
control dependence regions; they use path conditions to achieve precision in their analysis,
and to exhibit security leaks if the program is insecure.
JVM Bieber et al. (Bieber et al., 2002) provide an early study of information flow in the
JVM. Their method consists in specifying in the SMV model checker an abstract transi-
tion semantics of the JVM that manipulates security levels, and that can be used to verify
that an invariant that captures the absence of illicit flows is maintained throughout the
(abstract) program execution. Their method is directed towards smart card applications,
and thus only covers a sequential fragment of the JVM. While their method has been
used successfully to detect information leaks in a case study involving multi-application
smartcards, it is not supported by any soundness result. In a series of papers initiating
with (Bernardeschi and Francesco, 2002), Bernardeschi and co-workers also propose to
use abstract interpretation and model-checking techniques to verify secure information.
There are alternative approaches to verify information flow properties of bytecode pro-
grams. For example, Genaim and Spoto (Genaim and Spoto, 2005) have shown how to
represent information flow for Java bytecode through boolean functions; the representa-
tion allows checking via binary decision diagrams. Their analysis is fully automatic and
does not require that methods are annotated with security signatures.
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Typed assembly languages The idea of typing low-level programs and ensuring that com-
pilation preserves typing is not original to information flow, and has been investigated
in connection with type-directed compilation. Morrisett, Walker, Crary and Glew (Mor-
risett et al., 1999) develop a typed assembly language (TAL) based on a conventional
RISC assembly language, and show that typable programs of System F can be compiled
into typable TAL programs.
The study of non-interference for typed assembly languages has been initiated by
Bonelli, Compagnoni, and Medel (Bonelli et al., 2005), who developed a sound informa-
tion flow type system for a simple assembly language called SIFTAL. A specificity of
SIFTAL is to introduce pseudo-instructions that are used to enforce structured control
flow using a stack of continuations; more concretely, the pseudo-instructions are used to
push or retrieve linear continuations from the continuation stack. Unlike the stack of call
frames that is used in the JVM to handle method calls, the stack of continuations is used
for control flow within the body of a method. The use of pseudo-instructions allows to
formulate global constraints in the type system, and thus to guarantee non-interference.
More recent work by the same authors (Medel et al., 2005) and by Yu and Islam (Yu
and Islam, 2006) avoids the use of pseudo-instructions. In addition, Yu and Islam con-
sider a richer assembly language and prove type-preserving compilation for an imperative
language with procedures.
Flow-sensitive type systems and relational logics The type system presented in this paper
is flow-insensitive, in the sense that the security level of a variable is fixed throughout
the program execution. While it simplifies the description of the type system and its
soundness proof, flow-insensitivity restricts the generality of the type system, and leads
to secure programs being rejected. In contrast, flow-sensitive verification methods allow
the security level of variables to evolve throughout execution, and makes it possible to
type more programs. Examples of flow-sensitive methods include the logic of Banerjee
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et al (Amtoft et al., 2006), that allows to verify non-interference for an object-oriented
language, using independence assertions inspired from separation logic, the type system
of Hunt and Sands (Hunt and Sands, 2006), and the aforementioned analysis of Hammer
et al (Hammer et al., 2006).
While flow sensitivity adds useful expressiveness for a source language, its role is less
prominent in the case of type systems, like ours, that aim at verifying bytecode (or
executable code), as there exist SSA-like transformations that transform programs that
are accepted by flow-sensitive type systems into programs that are accepted by a flow-
insensitive one (Hunt and Sands, 2006).
3. The JVMI submachine
In this section, we define an information flow type system for a fragment of the JVM
with conditional and unconditional jumps and operations to manipulate the stack.
3.1. Programs, memory model, and operational semantics
Programs A JVMI program P is given by a list of instructions, taken from the instruction
set of Figure 1. We let the set X be the set of local variables and we let V be the set of
values, i.e. V = Z. Each program has a set of program points PP , which is defined as
{1 . . . n}, where n is the length of the list of instructions of P .
States The set StateI of JVMI states is defined as the set of triples 〈i, ρ, os〉, where
i ∈ PP is the program counter that points to the next instruction to be executed;
ρ ∈ X ⇀ V is a partial function from local variables to values, and os ∈ V⋆ is an operand
stack.
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instr ::= binop op binary operation on stack
| push c push value on top of stack
| pop pop value from top of stack
| swap swap the top two operand stack values
| load x load value of x on stack
| store x store top of stack in variable x
| ifeq j conditional jump
| goto j unconditional jump
| return return the top value of the stack
where op ∈ {+,−,×, /}, c ∈ Z, x ∈ X , and j ∈ PP .
Fig. 1. Instruction set for JVMI
Operational semantics The small-step operational semantics of the JVMI , is given in
Figure 2 as a relation ;⊆ StateI × (StateI + V), and is implicitly parametrised by a
program P .
In the figure, op denotes the standard interpretation of operation op in the domain
of values V . The semantics of each instruction is standard. Instruction push c, pushes a
constant c on top of the operand stack. Instruction binop op pops the two top operands
of the stack and pushes the result of the binary operation op using these operands.
Instruction pop just pops the top of the operand stack. Instruction swap swaps the two
top operand stack values. Instruction return ends the execution with the top value of the
operand stack. Instruction load x pushes, on top of the operand stack, the value currently
found in local variable x. Instruction store x pops the top of the stack and stores it in
local variable x. Instruction ifeq j pops the top of the stack and depending on whether it
is a null value or not, it jumps to the program point j or continue to the next program
point. Instruction goto j unconditionally jumps to program point j.
The transitive closure of ; is denoted by ;+.
Successor relation It is often convenient to view programs as graphs. The graph repre-
sentation of programs is given by specifying its entry point—by convention it is always
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P [i] = push n
〈i, ρ, os〉 ; 〈i + 1, ρ, n :: os〉
P [i] = binop op n2 op n1 = n
〈i, ρ, n1 :: n2 :: os〉 ; 〈i+ 1, ρ, n :: os〉
P [i] = pop
〈i, ρ, v :: os〉 ; 〈i+ 1, ρ, os〉
P [i] = swap
〈i, ρ, v1 :: v2 :: os〉 ; 〈i + 1, ρ, v2 :: v1 :: os〉
P [i] = return
〈i, ρ, v :: os〉 ; v
P [i] = load x x ∈ dom(ρ)
〈i, ρ, os〉 ; 〈i+ 1, ρ, ρ(x) :: os〉
P [i] = store x x ∈ dom(ρ)
〈i, ρ, v :: os〉 ; 〈i+ 1, ρ⊕{x 7→ v}, os〉
P [i] = ifeq j
〈i, ρ, 0 :: os〉 ; 〈j, ρ, os〉
P [i] = ifeq j n 6= 0
〈i, ρ, n :: os〉 ; 〈i+ 1, ρ, os〉
P [i] = goto j
〈i, ρ, os〉 ; 〈j, ρ, os〉
Fig. 2. Operational Semantics for JVMI
1—its exit points and the successor relation between program points. Intuitively, j is a
successor of i if performing a one-step execution from a state whose program point is i
may lead to a state whose program point is j. Besides, j is a return point if it corresponds
to a return instruction. Formally, the successor relation 7→⊆ PP × PP of a program P
is defined by the clauses:
— if P [i] = goto j, then i 7→ j;
— if P [i] = ifeq j, then i 7→ i+ 1 and i 7→ j;
— if P [i] = return, then i has no successors, and we write i 7→;
— otherwise, i 7→ i+ 1.
One also defines for each program P its set PPr of return points, i.e. of programs points
with no successor—or equivalently, program points that are mapped to a return instruc-
tion. By abuse of notation, we write i 7→ if i ∈ PPr.
3.2. Non-Interference
The security policy is given by a lattice (S,≤) of security levels, and the policy of the
program. In the JVMI fragment, the policy of a program P is given by a statement of
the form ~kv −→ kr, where ~kv assigns a security level to the each local variables, and kr
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sets a security level of its output. In the sequel, we often view ~kv as a partial mapping
from variables to security levels. The notion of non-interferent program is also defined
relative to a security level kobs corresponding to the attacker; essentially, the attacker
can observe return values and variables whose level is less than or equal to kobs.
The policy of the program and the security level of the attacker induce a notion of
indistinguishability between local variable maps.
Definition 3.1 (Local variables indistinguishability). For ρ, ρ′ : X ⇀ V , we have
ρ ∼ ~kv ,kobs ρ
′ if ρ and ρ′ have the same domain and ρ(x) = ρ′(x) for all x ∈ dom(ρ) such
that ~kv(x) ≤ kobs.
In the remaining of the paper, we shall sometimes omit the subscripts ~kv and kobs when-
ever there is no risk of confusion. Next, we define the notion of non-interferent program:
first, we define a weak notion of non-interferent program for a fixed attacker level; then,
we say that a program is non-interferent iff it is non-interferent for all attacker levels.
Definition 3.2 (Non-interferent JVMI program). A program P is non-interferent
w.r.t. policy ~kv −→ kr and attacker level kobs, if either kr 6≤ kobs or v1 = v2 for every
ρ1, ρ2, v1, v2 such that 〈1, ρ1, ǫ〉;+ v1 and 〈1, ρ2, ǫ〉;+ v2 and ρ1 ∼ ~kv,kobs ρ2.
Moreover, a program P is non-interferent w.r.t. policy ~kv −→ kr iff for all attacker
levels kobs, P is non-interferent w.r.t. ~kv −→ kr and kobs.
Our definition of non-interference is termination-insensitive, i.e. does not take into ac-
count non-terminating executions of programs. Stronger definitions, that reject programs
whose termination behaviour depend on high inputs, have been considered in the litera-
ture, but the type systems enforcing such policies tend to impose strong restrictions on
loops.
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3.3. Informal presentation of the type system
This paragraph is devoted to pointing out issues about enforcing non-interference for
unstructured programs, and providing an informal account of the solutions.
Like any other information flow type system, our type system must prevent leakages
that occur through assigning secret values to public variables (direct flows), or through
branching over expressions that depend on secrets, and performing in the branches oper-
ations that affect the visible part of the state (indirect flows). Our type system prevents
direct flows through stack types, and indirect flows through a combination of control
dependence regions and security environment.
Direct flows In a high level language, direct flows are prevented by the typing rule for
assignments, which is usually of the form (Volpano and Smith, 1997)
⊢ e : k k ≤ ~kv(x)
⊢ x := e : ~kv(x)
where ~kv(x) is the security given to variable x by the policy and k is an upper bound of
the security level of the variables occurring in the expression e. The constraint k ≤ ~kv(x)
ensures that the value stored in x does not depend of any variable whose security level
is not less than and not equal to that of x, and thus that there is no illicit flow to x.
In a low level language where intermediate computations are performed with an operand
stack, direct information flows are prevented by assigning a security level to each value
in the operand stack, via a so-called stack type, and by rejecting programs that attempt
to store a value in a low variable when the top of the stack type is high:
P [i] = load x
i ⊢ st⇒ ~kv(x) :: st
P [i] = store x k ≤ ~kv(x)
i ⊢ k :: st⇒ st
where st represents a stack type (a stack of security levels) and ⇒ represents a relation
between the stack type before execution and the stack type after execution of load.
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For instance, xL := yH is rejected by any sound information flow type system for a
while language, because the constraintH ≤ L generated by the typing rule for assignment
is violated. Likewise, the low level counterpart
load yH
store xL
cannot be typed as the typing rule for load forces the top of the stack type as high after
executing the instruction, and the typing rule for store generates the constraint H ≤ L.
Indirect flows In a high level language with structured control flow, typing judgements
are of the form ⊢ c : k. Informally, if a command c is typable then it is non-interfering,
and moreover if ⊢ c : H then c does not modify any low variable. In such systems,
indirect flows are prevented by the typing rules branching statements, which for if-then-
else statements is usually of the form (Volpano and Smith, 1997):
⊢ e : k ⊢ c1 : k1 ⊢ c2 : k2 k ≤ k1, k2
⊢ if e then c1 else c2 : k
and thus ensures that the write effects of c1 and c2 are not less or equal to the guard of
the branching statement.
To prevent illicit flows in a low-level language, the typing rules for branching instruc-
tions cannot simply enforce local constraints, i.e. they cannot talk only about the current
program point and its successors. Instead, the typing rules must also enforce global con-
straints that prevent low assignments and updates to occur under high guards. Therefore,
the typing rules rely on a graph representation of the program, and an approximation of
the scope of branching statements using control dependence regions.
Control dependence regions Our type system assumes that programs are bundled with
additional information about their control dependence regions. This assumption is in
line with the intended usage of our type checker as a lightweight bytecode verifier and
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streamlines the presentation by allowing us to focus on the information flow analysis itself.
The information is given in the form of two functions region and jun. The intuition behind
regions and junction points is that region(i) includes all program points executing under
the guard at i and that jun(i), if it exists, is the sole exit from the region of i; in particular,
whenever jun(i) is defined there should be no return instruction in region(i). Figure 3
provides examples of regions of two compiled programs. Note that in the rightmost
picture, which corresponds to an if-then-else statement, the branching point i does not
belong to its region, whereas in the leftmost picture, which corresponds to a while-do
statement, the branching point i does belong to its region.
region(i)
jun(i)
i
jun(i)
region(i)
i
Fig. 3. Example of CDR for a while and an if construct.
The soundness of the type system requires that the functions verify the following
properties: any successor of i either belongs to the region of i, or is equal to jun(i) (if
defined), and jun(i) is the sole exit to the region of i; in particular if jun(i) is defined
there should be no return instruction in region(i).
Definition 3.3 (SAFE CDR structure). A control dependence region (CDR) struc-
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ture (region, jun) given by a total function region and a partial function jun is safe if the
following properties hold:
CDR1 for all program points i and all successors j, k of i (i 7→ j and i 7→ k) such that
j 6= k (i is hence a branching point), k ∈ region(i) or k = jun(i);
CDR2 for all program points i, j, k, if j ∈ region(i) and j 7→ k, then either k ∈ region(i)
or k = jun(i);
CDR3 for all program points i, j, if j ∈ region(i) and j 7→ then jun(i) is undefined.
Subsection 3.6 provides additional information on computing and checking CDR struc-
tures. For the purpose of the soundness of the type system, it is sufficient to know that
the program is packaged with a CDR structure that satisfies the above properties.
Security environments The type system is further parametrised by a security environ-
ment that attaches a security level to each program point. Informally, the security level
of a program point is an upper bound of all the guards under which the program point
executes.
The security environment is used in conjunction with the CDR information to prevent
implicit flows. This is done in two steps: on the one hand, the typing rule for branching
statements enforces that the security environment of a program point is indeed an upper
bound of the guard under which it executes; for instance, the rule for ifeq bytecode is of
the form:
P [i] = ifeq j ∀j′ ∈ region(i), k ≤ se(j′)
i ⊢ k :: st⇒ · · ·
On the other hand, the typing rules for instructions with write effect, e.g. store, must
check that the security level of the variable or field to be written is at least as high as
the current security environment. For instance, the rule for store becomes:
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P [i] = store x k ⊔ se(i) ≤ ~kv(x)
i ⊢ k :: st⇒ st
The combination of both rules allows to prevent indirect flows. For instance, the standard
example of indirect flow if (yH) {xL = 0; } else {xL = 1; } is compiled in our low-level
language as
load yH
ifeq l1
push 0
store xL
goto l2
l1 : push 1
store xL
l2 : . . .
By requiring that se(i) ≤ ~kv(x), where i is the program point of the store instruction,
and by requiring a global constraint on the security environment in the for ifeq, the type
system ensures that the above program will be rejected: se(i) must be H if the store
instruction is under the influence of a high ifeq, and thus the transition for the store
instruction cannot be typed.
3.4. Typing rules
Our typing rules are of the form:
P [i] = ins constraints
~kv −→ kr, region, se, i ⊢ st⇒ st′
P [i] = ins constraints
~kv −→ kr, region, se, i ⊢ st⇒
where ~kv −→ kr is a policy, st, st′ ∈ S⋆ are stacks of security levels, and ins is an
instruction found at point i in program P . Our type rules do not record the types of
variables: indeed, our type system is flow-insensitive.
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P [i] = pop
~kv → kr , region, se, i ⊢ k :: st⇒ st
P [i] = binop op
~kv → kr , region, se, i ⊢ k1 :: k2 :: st⇒ (k1 ⊔ k2 ⊔ se(i)) :: st
P [i] = push n
~kv → kr, region, se, i ⊢ st⇒ se(i) :: st
P [i] = swap
~kv → kr, region, se, i ⊢ k1 :: k2 :: st⇒ k2 :: k1 :: st
P [i] = store x se(i) ⊔ k ≤ ~kv(x)
~kv → kr , region, se, i ⊢ k :: st⇒ st
P [i] = load x
~kv → kr , region, se, i ⊢ st ⇒
(
~kv(x) ⊔ se(i)
)
:: st
P [i] = goto j
~kv → kr , region, se, i ⊢ st⇒ st
P [i] = return se(i) ⊔ k ≤ kr
~kv → kr , region, se, i ⊢ k :: st⇒
P [i] = ifeq j ∀j′ ∈ region(i), k ≤ se(j′)
~kv → kr , region, se, i ⊢ k :: st ⇒ liftk(st)
Fig. 4. Transfer rules for instructions in JVMI
Typing rules are used to establish a notion of typability. Following Freund andMitchell (Fre-
und and Mitchell, 2003), typability stipulates the existence of a function, that maps
program points to stack types, such that each transition is well-typed.
Definition 3.4 (Typable program). A program P is typable w.r.t. a given policy
~kv −→ kr, a CDR structure region : PP → ℘(PP), and a security environment se :
PP → S if there exists a function S : PP → S⋆, called a global typing, such that S1 = ε
(the operand stack is empty at the initial program point 1), and for all i, j ∈ PP :
1 i 7→ j implies that there exists st ∈ S⋆ such that ~kv −→ kr, region, se, i ⊢ Si ⇒ st and
st ⊑ Sj ;
2 i 7→ implies that ~kv −→ kr, region, se, i ⊢ Si ⇒;
where we write Si instead of S(i) and ⊑ denotes the point-wise partial order on type
stack with respect to the partial order taken on security levels. Two type stacks are in
relation only if they have the same size.
It may be helpful to read the definition of typable program from the view of abstract
interpretation. Informally, a program P has type S iff S is a post-fixpoint of the system
of data flow equations induced by the transfer rules.
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Figure 4 presents the typing rules for the JVMI . We let ⊔ denote the lub of two
security levels, and for every k ∈ S, we let liftk be the point-wise extension to stack
types of λl. k ⊔ l. All rules are parametrised by a CDR region, a security environment se
and a policy ~ka −→ kr.
Below we comment on some essential rules:
— The transfer rule for an instruction push n prevents indirect flows by requiring that
the value pushed on top of the operand stack has a security level greater than the
security environment at the current program point. The following example, compiled
from the source program return yH ? 0 : 1;, illustrates the need for this constraint:
load yH
l1 : ifeq l2
push 0
goto l3
l2 : push 1


region(l1)
l3 : return
The program is interferent with respect to the policy (yH : H) −→ L, and hence
it should not typable. The typing rule for return instruction rightfully rejects this
program because the top of the stack is typed as high when reaching point l3. Indeed,
the instructions push 0 and push 1 are in the region of the branching instruction ifeq l1
and the security environment se is high at this point.
— the typing rule for ifeq requires the stack type on the right hand side of ⇒ to be
lifted by the level of the guard, i.e. the top of the input stack type. It is necessary to
perform this lifting operation to prevent illicit flows through operand stack leakages.
The following example illustrates why we need to lift the operand stack. This is a
contrived example because it does not correspond to any simple source code, but it
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is nevertheless accepted by a standard bytecode verifier.
push 0
push 1
load yH
l1 : ifeq l2
swap
pop
goto l3
l2 : pop


region(l1)
l3 : store xL
In this example, the final value of variable xL is equal to 0 or 1 and reveals if the value
of yH is 0 or not. So the program is interferent. Our type system rightfully rejects
this program. Indeed, the rule for ifeq at point l1 lifts the operand stack as high and
in particular constrains the top of the stack at point l3 to be a high value; as the rule
for store prevents the assignment from high to low, the program is rejected.
One may argue that lifting the entire stack is too restrictive, as it leads the typing
system to reject safe programs; indeed, it should be possible, at the cost of added
complexity, to refine the type system to avoid lifting the entire stack.
One may also argue that lifting the stack is unnecessary, because in most programs†
the stack at branching points only has one element, in which case a more restrictive
rule of the form below is sufficient:
P [i] = ifeq j ∀j′ ∈ region(i).k ≤ se(j′)
i ⊢ k :: ǫ⇒ ǫ
— The transfer rule for return requires se(i) ≤ kr that prevents return instructions under
† And even if this condition does not hold, code transformation is able to obtain an equivalent program
respecting it (Leroy, 2002).
A Certified Lightweight Non-Interference Java Bytecode Verifier 23
the guard of expressions with a security level greater than kr. In addition, the rule
requires that the value on top of the operand stack has a security level ≤ kr, since
it will be observed by the attacker at level kr. The following example illustrates the
need for preventing return instructions in high regions. It corresponds to the source
program if (yH) {return 0; } else {return 1; }.
load yH
l1 : ifeq l2
push 0
return
l2 : push 1
return


region(l1)
This program is interferent w.r.t a policy ~kv −→ L because there is a return in a
high ifeq and the result will be observed by the attacker. This program is rightfully
rejected by the type system: the rule for the ifeq forces the operand stack to be high
upon reaching the return instruction, and the return rule prevents the program from
returning an observable value in a high security environment.
3.5. Type system soundness
The type system is sound, in the sense that if a program is typable then it is non-
interferent.
Theorem 3.5. Let P be a typable JVMI program w.r.t. a safe CDR (region, jun) and
with a policy ~ka −→ kr. Then P is non-interferent with respect to the policy associated
with ~ka −→ kr.
The proof of soundness is based on some assumptions concerning the CDR information,
two unwinding lemmas and two lemmas about preserving high contexts.
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The unwinding lemmas show that the execution of typable programs does not reveal se-
cret information. They are stated relative to the small-step semantics ; and to a notion
of state indistinguishability ∼. The main difficulty in defining state indistinguishabil-
ity resides in defining a good notion of operand stack indistinguishability. In order to
account for high branching instructions, and to allow proving the step consistent un-
winding lemmas—see below—indistinguishability between states must encompass states
that have operand stacks of different length.
We require operand stacks to be indistinguishable point-wise on some common top
part, and then to be high in the bottom part on which they may not coincide as shown
in Figure 5. High operand stacks are defined relative to a stack type.
Definition 3.6 (High operand stack). Let os ∈ V⋆ be an operand stack and st ∈ S⋆
be a stack type; we write high(os, st) if os and st have the same length n and st[i] 6≤ kobs
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Definition 3.7 (Operand stack indistinguishability). Let os, os′ ∈ V⋆ and st, st′ ∈
S⋆. Then os : st ∼ os′ : st′ is defined inductively as follows:
high(os, st) high(os′, st′)
os : st ∼ os′ : st′
os : st ∼ os′ : st′ v = v′ k ≤ kobs
v :: os : k :: st ∼ v′ :: os′ : k :: st′
os : st ∼ os′ : st′ k 6≤ kobs k′ 6≤ kobs
v :: os : k :: st ∼ v′ :: os′ : k′ :: st′
Note that in the second rule the top of the two stack types are necessary equal (and low),
while in the last rule they can be distinct (but not low). This distinction is necessary
because we handle an arbitrary lattice of security levels.
State indistinguishability can then be defined component-wise on state structure.
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Operand stack Legend
indistinguishability
High values
Low values
Fig. 5. Operand stack indistinguishability
Definition 3.8 (State indistinguishability). Two states 〈i, ρ, os〉 and 〈i′, ρ′, os′〉 are
indistinguishable w.r.t. st, st′ ∈ S⋆, denoted 〈i, ρ, os〉 : st ∼ 〈i′, ρ′, os′〉 : st′, iff
os : st ∼ os′ : st′ and ρ ∼ ρ′ hold.
Besides, we say that the security environment se is high in region region(i) if se(j) 6≤ kobs
for all j ∈ region(i). A state 〈i, ρ, os〉 and a stack type st are high if high(os, st) holds.
We now turn to the unwinding lemmas. The lemmas consider a program P that comes
equipped with its policy ~kv −→ kr , its CDR structure (region, jun) and security environ-
ment se. All are left implicit in the rest of this section. The lemmas state:
— locally respects: if s1 : st1 ∼ s2 : st2, and pc(s1) = pc(s2) = i, and s1 ; s′1, s2 ; s
′
2,
i ⊢ st1 ⇒ st
′
1, and i ⊢ st2 ⇒ st
′
2, then s
′
1 : st
′
1 ∼ s
′
2 : st
′
2.
— step consistent: if s1 : st1 ∼ s2 : st2 and s1 ; s′1 and pc(s1) ⊢ st1 ⇒ st
′
1, and
se(pc(s1)) 6≤ kobs, and (st1, s1) is high, then s′1 : st
′
1 ∼ s2 : st2.
Both lemmas are proved by a case analysis on the instruction to be executed.
To repeatedly apply unwinding lemmas, we need to have a family of results that deals
with preservation of high contexts.
— high branching: if s1 : st1 ∼ s2 : st2 with pc(s1) = pc(s2) = i and pc(s
′
1) 6= pc(s
′
2), if
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s1 ; s
′
1, s2 ; s
′
2, i ⊢ st1 ⇒ st
′
1 and i ⊢ st2 ⇒ st
′
2, then (s
′
1, st
′
1) and (s
′
2, st
′
2) is high
and se is high in region region(i).
— high step: if s ; s′, and pc(s) ⊢ st ⇒ st ′, and se(pc(s)) 6≤ kobs, and (s, st) is high,
then (s′, st ′) is high.
These lemmas are proved by case analysis on the instruction being executed, and rely on
the CDR properties.
The second family of results deals with monotonicity of indistinguishability.
— high stack type sub-typing: if (s, st) is high and st ⊑ st ′ then (s, st ′) is high.
— indistinguishability double monotonicity: if s1 : st1 ∼ s2 : st2, st1 ⊑ st and st2 ⊑ st
then s1 : st ∼ s2 : st .
— indistinguishability single monotonicity: if s1 : st1 ∼ s2 : st2, st1 ⊑ st ′1 and (s1, st1)
is high then s1 : st
′
1 ∼ s2 : st2.
The proof makes use of the unwinding lemmas, the high context lemmas, the monotonic-
ity lemmas and the CDR properties, and proceeds by induction on execution traces. In
the induction step‡ we have two executions s0 ; · · ·; sn and s′0 ; · · ·; s
′
m such that
pc(s0) = pc(s
′
0) and s0 : Spc(s0) ∼ s
′
0 : Spc(s′0) and we want to establish that states sn
and s′m are indistinguishable:
sn : Spc(sn) ∼ s
′
m : Spc(s′m)
or both (sn, Spc(sn)) and (s
′
m, Spc(s′m)) are high.
We assume the property holds for any strictly shorter execution traces (induction
hypothesis) and suppose n > 0 and m > 0. We write i0 = pc(s0) = pc(s
′
0). We first
remark that by the locally respects lemma and the typability hypothesis, s1 : st ∼ s′1 : st
′
for some stack types st and st ′ such that i0 ⊢ Si0 ⇒ st , st ⊑ Spc(s1), i0 ⊢ Si0 ⇒ st
′,
st ′ ⊑ Spc(s′
1
).
‡ Base cases depend on technical properties about return points that we omit in this Section.
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— If pc(s1) = pc(s
′
1) we can apply the indistinguishability double monotonicity lemma
to establish that s1 : Spc(s1) ∼ s
′
1 : Spc(s′1) and conclude by induction hypothesis.
— If pc(s1) 6= pc(s
′
1) we know by the high branching lemma that se is high in region
region(i0) and (s1, st) and (s
′
1, st
′) are high. Thanks to the high stack type sub-typing
lemma it implies that both (s1, Spc(s1)) and (s
′
1, Spc(s′1)) are high. By CDR1 we know
that pc(s1) ∈ region(i0) or pc(s1) = jun(i0). Now by induction on the trace s1 ;
· · · ; sn we easily show that either there exists k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that k = jun(i0)
and sk : Spc(sk) ∼ s
′
0 : Si0 (the junction point is reached) or pc(sn) ∈ region(i0)
and (sn, Spc(sn)) is high (the trace stays in the region of i0). This is proved thanks to
CDR2, high step lemma and indistinguishability single monotonicity lemma. Note that
in the second case where pc(sn) ∈ region(i0), we have necessarily jun(i0) undefined
by CDR3. A similar property holds for trace s′1 ; · · · ; s
′
m and we can group the
different cases in two main cases:
1 jun(i0) is defined and there exists k, k
′, 1 ≤ k ≤ n and 1 ≤ k′ ≤ m such that
k = k′ = jun(i0) and sk : Spc(sk) ∼ s
′
0 : Si0 and s0 : Si0 ∼ s
′
k′ : Spc(s′k′ ). Since
s0 : Si0 ∼ s
′
0 : Si0 we have by transitivity and symmetry of ∼, sk : Spc(sk) ∼ s
′
k′ :
Spc(s′
k′
) with pc(sk) = pc(s
′
k′ ) and we can conclude by induction hypothesis.
2 jun(i0) is undefined and both (sn, Spc(sn)) and (s
′
m, Spc(s′m)) are high.
3.6. Computing and verifying the CDR structure
The CDR information comes bundled with the code and hence is untrusted. Therefore,
it must be verified by a CDR checker; specifically, the CDR checker will ensure that
the CDR information complies with the CDR properties—we have shown that these
properties are sufficient to guarantee soundness of the type system. The CDR properties
can be checked naively in cubic time, and under specific hypotheses, one can design more
effective verification methods.
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A related issue is how to compute control dependence regions that satisfy the CDR
properties. In fact, CDRs are tightly connected to post-dominators, and it is reasonably
easy to prove that the CDR properties hold whenever the CDR information is computed
using post-dominators. Recall that a program point j post-dominates another program
point i, if i 7→+ j, i.e. j is reachable from i in a non-zero number of steps, and for every
return point k, all paths from i to k go through j. Then, we say that j is the junction
point of i, written jun(i), if i is a branching point and j is equal to or is post-dominated by
all post-dominators of i. With such a definition, the junction point is a partial function:
for example, a branching point that contains a return statement in one of its branches
does not have a junction point. Finally, we define region(i) as the set of points that can
be reached from i and that are post-dominated by jun(i), i.e. j ∈ region(i) iff i 7→+ j and
jun(i) post-dominates j—in particular, jun(i) is defined; if not, j ∈ region(i) iff i 7→+ j.
Note that, under this construction, i ∈ region(i) entails i 7→+ i.
3.7. Verifying typability
Typability of a program against a policy can be verified via a dataflow analysis (Hankin
et al., 2005). More specifically, the checker takes as input a program with its CDR
information and with its security annotations, in this case a security environment, a
security level for each variable and the result, and a type (i.e. a map from program
points to stack type), and checks that the program is typable using a lightweight variant
of Kildall’s algorithm, see e.g. (Rose, 2003). Since programs are annotated, the checker
does not perform a fixpoint computation, but verifies the program in one pass.
We briefly comment on some practical issues regarding using our lightweight informa-
tion flow checker in a Proof Carrying Code scenario. First, our checker requires programs
to carry a significant amount of annotation; however, its role is merely to check that the
program is secure, whereas the task of automatically inferring annotations and alleviating
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instr ::= . . .
| new C create new object in the heap
| getfield f load value of field f on stack
| putfield f store top of stack in field f
| newarray t create new array of element of type t in the heap
| arraylength get the length of an array
| arrayload load value from an array
| arraystore store value in array
where C ∈ C, f ∈ F and t ∈ TJ .
Fig. 6. Additional instruction set for JVMO
the programmer’s burden is typically done at source level. Second, the security environ-
ment, program type, and control dependence regions can be generated automatically by
a certifying compiler; hence, the process of generating an annotated JVM program that
is processable by our checker from a typable Java program can be automated. Finally, the
information flow checker is “reasonably efficient”, in the sense that the CDR information
can be computed efficiently, the data flow analysis is performed in a single pass, and the
constraints generated by the transfer rules only involve inequalities on security levels.
4. JVMO: The object-oriented extension of JVMI
The object-oriented extension of JVMI , namely JVMO, includes arrays, instance fields,
creation of new instances, and null pointers. On the other hand, it does not feature
methods, which are only added in Section 5.
4.1. Programs, memory model, and operational semantics
Programs JVMO programs are extended JVMI programs, equipped with a set C of class
names, a set F of identifiers representing field names and a set TJ of Java types (a precise
description of these types is not necessary here).
Programs use an extended set of instructions, given in Figure 6.
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States The set of JVMO values is extended to V = Z ∪ L ∪ {null}, where L is an
(infinite) set of locations and null denotes the null pointer. By distinguishing between
locations and integer values, we can enforce in the semantics of programs that they do
not perform pointer arithmetic in JVMO.
A JVMO state is now of the form 〈i, ρ, os, h〉, where i, ρ, and os are defined as in JVMI
and h is a heap, that accommodates dynamically created objects and arrays. Heaps are
modelled as partial functions h : L⇀ O +A, where the set O of objects is model-ed as
C × (F ⇀ V), i.e. each object o ∈ O possesses a class (written as class(o)) and a partial
function to access field values, and the set A of arrays is model-ed as N× (N ⇀ V)×PP ,
i.e. each array a ∈ A possesses a length (written as a.length), a partial function to access
array values and a creation point. We write o.f for the access to the value of field f ,
o⊕{f 7→ v} denotes the update of an object o at field f with a value v (h⊕{l 7→ o} is
used in the same way for heap update) and Heap is the set of heaps.
Operational semantics The operational semantics for the new instructions relies on an
allocator function fresh : Heap → L that given a heap returns the location for a fresh
object, and on a function default : C → O that returns for each class a default object of
that class. Function default is specified according to the standard Java convention§: for
all defined field f ∈ F of a class C ∈ C,
default(C).f =


0 if f has a numeric type
null if f has a object type
A similar operator defaultArray : N× TJ → (N ⇀ V) models array initialisation.
The semantics is given in Figure 7 as a relation ; ⊆ StateO × (StateO + (V ×Heap)).
Instruction new C pushes a fresh location on top of the operand stack associated to a new
initialised object. The heap is updated with this new object. Instruction getfield f pops
§ We assume each field f has a declared type.
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P [i] = new C l = fresh(h)
〈i, ρ, os, h〉 ; 〈i+ 1, ρ, l :: os, h⊕{l 7→ default(C)}〉
P [i] = getfield f l ∈ dom(h) f ∈ dom(h(l))
〈i, ρ, l :: os, h〉 ; 〈i+ 1, ρ, h(l).f :: os, h〉
P [i] = putfield f l ∈ dom(h) f ∈ dom(h(l))
〈i, ρ, v :: l :: os, h〉 ; 〈i + 1, ρ, os, h⊕{l 7→ h(l)⊕{f 7→ v}}〉
P [i] = return
〈i, ρ, v :: os, h〉 ; v, h
P [i] = newarray t l = fresh(h) n ≥ 0
〈i, ρ, n :: os, h〉 ; 〈i+ 1, ρ, l :: os, h⊕{l 7→ (n, defaultArray(n, t), i)}〉
P [i] = arraylength l ∈ dom(h)
〈i, ρ, l :: os, h〉 ; 〈i+ 1, ρ, h(l).length :: os, h〉
P [i] = arrayload l ∈ dom(h) 0 ≤ j < h(l).length
〈i, ρ, j :: l :: os, h〉 ; 〈i + 1, ρ, h(l)[j] :: os, h〉
P [i] = arraystore l ∈ dom(h) 0 ≤ j < h(l).length
〈i, ρ, v :: j :: l :: os, h〉 ; 〈i + 1, ρ, os, h⊕{l 7→ h(l)⊕{j 7→ v}}〉
Fig. 7. Operational Semantics for additional JVMO instructions
a location l from the operand stack. The value of the field f in location l is fetched and
pushed onto the operand stack. Instruction putfield f uses the top of the stack to update
the object associated with the location under the top of the operand stack. Instruc-
tion return now returns the top of the operand stack, and the current heap. Instruction
newarray t pops a positive integer n from the operand stack to create a new initialised
array and pushes the corresponding fresh location on top of the operand stack. The heap
is updated with this new array including its length n and its creation point i. Instruction
arraylength pops a location l from the operand stack and pushes the length of the corre-
sponding array. Instruction arrayload pops an index j and a location l from the operand
stack. The content of the array in location l at index j is fetched and pushed onto the
operand stack. Instruction arraystore stores the top of the stack into the j-th element of
an array a, where j and a are determined by the second and third values in the stack
respectively.
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Successor relation The successor relation is extended with the clause i 7→ i + 1 for all
new instructions.
4.2. Non-Interference
In order to extend the notion of indistinguishability to heaps we follow (Banerjee and
Naumann, 2005): we consider that heaps with different locations for “high” objects (i.e.
objects that have been created in a high security environment) are indistinguishable by
an attacker; therefore indistinguishability is defined relative to a bijection β on (a partial
set of) locations in the heap. The bijection maps low objects (low objects are objects
whose references might be stored in low fields or low variables) allocated in the heap of
the first state to low objects allocated in the heap of the second state. The objects might
be indistinguishable, even if their locations are different during execution. Since values
can now also be locations, value indistinguishability is defined relative to the bijection β.
For array objects, we extend security levels, with array levels of the form k[kc]. These
levels represent the security level of an array, distinguishing the level kc of the content of
the array (which could be itself an array) and the level k of the length of the array and of
the reference itself. Hence an array of type L[H ] can be only updated in a high context
(its content is high) but allocated in any context (its length and the value of its reference
are low). We denote by Sext the extension of security levels S with array security levels.
The partial order on S is extended to ≤ext with the following inductive definition
k ≤ k′ k, k′ ∈ S
k≤extk′
k ≤ k′ k, k′ ∈ S kc ∈ Sext
k[kc]≤
extk′[kc]
An extended level k[kc] is considered to be low (written as k[kc] ≤ kobs) if k ≤ kobs. More
generally, every time we compare an element k[kc] ∈ Sext with an element k0 ∈ S, we just
compare k and k0 w.r.t. the partial order on S only. Apart from kobs and the elements
of the security environments, every previous types (security types of variable and stack
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types) are now elements of Sext. Indistinguishability for JVMO is defined relative to a
global mapping ft : F → Sext that maps fields to security levels (ft will be left implicit
in the rest of the paper).
Definition 4.1 (Value indistinguishability). Given two values v1, v2 ∈ V , and a
partial function β ∈ L⇀ L, value indistinguishability v1 ∼β v2 is defined by the clauses:
null ∼β null
v ∈ N
v ∼β v
v1, v2 ∈ L β(v1) = v2
v1 ∼β v2
Both definitions of operand stack indistinguishability and local variables indistinguisha-
bility are now parametrised by β since values on the operand stack and in variables can
also be locations.
Indistinguishability for array objects is defined relative to a global mapping at : PP →
Sext that maps creation point of arrays to security levels for their contents. The mapping
at will be left implicit in the rest of the paper. We will abusively denote at(a) as the
level that is associated with the creation point of an array a. The definition of array
indistinguishability says that two arrays are indistinguishable if they have the same
length and if their contents are indistinguishable when their level is low.
Definition 4.2 (Array indistinguishability). Two arrays a1, a2 ∈ A are indistin-
guishable with respect to an attacker level kobs and a function β ∈ L⇀ L if and only if
a1.length = a2.length, at(a1) = at(a2) and moreover, if at(a1) ≤ kobs then for all index i
such that 0 ≤ i < a1.length, a1[i] ∼β a2[i].
The definition of object indistinguishability says that two objects are indistinguishable
if they have the same class and the values held in their low fields are indistinguishable.
Definition 4.3 (Object indistinguishability). Two objects o1, o2 ∈ O are indistin-
guishable with respect to an attacker level kobs and a function β ∈ L⇀ L if and only if o1
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and o2 are objects of the same class and for all fields f ∈ dom(o1) such that ft(f) ≤ kobs,
o1.f ∼β o2.f .
Note that because o1 and o2 are objects of the same class we have dom(o1) = dom(o2)
and o2(f) is well defined.
Heap indistinguishability requires β to be a bijection between the low domains (i.e.
locations that might be reachable from low local variables/fields) of the considered heaps.
Definition 4.4 (Heap indistinguishability). Two heaps h1 and h2 are indistinguish-
able with respect to an attacker level kobs and a partial function β ∈ L ⇀ L, written
h1 ∼kobs,β h2, if and only if:
— β is a bijection between dom(β) and rng(β);
— dom(β) ⊆ dom(h1) and rng(β) ⊆ dom(h2);
— for every l ∈ dom(β), h1(l) ∼kobs,β h2(β(l)) and h1(l) and h2(β(l)) are either two
objects or two arrays;
As in JVMI , state indistinguishability can then be defined component-wise on state
structure.
Finally, non-interference in JVMO is extended using the relations defined above.
Definition 4.5 (Non-interferent JVMO program). A program P is non-interferent
w.r.t. its policy ~kv −→ kr, if for every attacker level kobs and every partial function
β ∈ L ⇀ L and every ρ1, ρ2 ∈ X ⇀ V , h1, h2, h
′
1, h
′
2 ∈ Heap, v1, v2 ∈ V such that
〈1, ρ1, ǫ, h1〉 ;+ v1, h′1, 〈1, ρ2, ǫ, h2〉 ;
+ v2, h
′
2 and h1 ∼kobs,β h2, ρ1 ∼ ~kv ,kobs,β ρ2, there
exists a partial function β′ ∈ L ⇀ L such that β ⊆ β′, h1 ∼kobs,β′ h2 and moreover, if
kr ≤ kobs then v1 ∼β′ v2.
Here β ⊆ β′ means that dom(β) ⊆ dom(β′) and for all locations l ∈ dom(β), β(l) = β′(l).
A Certified Lightweight Non-Interference Java Bytecode Verifier 35
P [i] = new C
~kv → kr , region, se, i ⊢ st ⇒ se(i) :: st
P [i] = putfield f (se(i) ⊔ k2)⊔
extk1 ≤ ft(f) k1 ∈ S
ext k2 ∈ S
~kv → kr, region, se, i ⊢ k1 :: k2 :: st ⇒ st
P [i] = getfield f k ∈ S
~kv → kr , region, se, i ⊢ k :: st ⇒
(
(k ⊔ se(i))⊔extft(f)
)
:: st
P [i] = newarray t k ∈ S
~kv → kr , region, se, i ⊢ k :: st ⇒ k[at(i)] :: st
P [i] = arraylength k ∈ S kc ∈ S
ext
~kv → kr, region, se, i ⊢ k[kc] :: st ⇒ k :: st
P [i] = arrayload k1, k2 ∈ S kc ∈ S
ext
~kv → kr , region, se, i ⊢ k1 :: k2[kc] :: st ⇒ ((k1 ⊔ k2)⊔
extkc) :: st
P [i] = arraystore ((k2 ⊔ k3)⊔
extk1)≤
extkc k2, k3 ∈ S k1, kc ∈ S
ext
~kv → kr , region, se, i ⊢ k1 :: k2 :: k3[kc] :: st ⇒ st
Fig. 8. Additional typing transfer rules for JVMO
The definition of non-interference allows for β to be extended, in order to handle objects
that are dynamically created during the execution.
4.3. Typing rules
The abstract transition system of the JVMO extends that of the JVMI with the typing
transfer rules of Figure 8. The typing rules we propose for arrays follow Askarov and
Sabelfeld (Askarov and Sabelfeld, 2005) who argue that public arrays must be allowed
to handle secret information in order to achieve any realistic case study like the mental
poker they have programmed in Jif (Myers, 1999).
— The transfer rule for new adds to the stack type the security level of the current
program point, which imposes a constraint on the security level from which the object
can be accessed. For example, if new is executed in a high security environment, then
the reference to the object cannot be accessed from a low variable. However, if the
object is created in a low security environment it can either be stored in a high or
low variable/field.
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— The transfer rule for putfield requires that k1 ≤ ft(f) (where k1 is the security type of
the field of the object) in order to prevent an explicit flow from a high value to a low
field. The constraint se(i) ≤ ft(f) prevents an implicit flow caused by an assignment to
a low field in a high security environment. Finally, the constraint k2 ≤ ft(f) prevents
modifying low fields of high objects that may be aliases to low objects.
To illustrate this last point, consider the source program
C xL = new C();
zH = yH ? new C() : xL;
zH.fL = 1;
We assume that C is a class that has a low field named fL. Let xL be a low variable
and yH , zH high variables. The bytecode for this program is:
new C
store xL
load yH
l1 : ifeq l2
new C
goto l3
l2 : load xL


region(l1)
l3 : store zH
load zH
push 1
putfield fL
In this program, depending on the test on yH , variable xL and zH might be aliases
to the same object (of class C). Hence, the assignment to field fL might have a side
effect on the object in xL. This program is rejected thanks to the putfield rule which
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avoids this type of leaks due to aliasing (with the constraint k2 ≤ ft(f) preventing
assignments to low fields from high target objects).
— In the rule for getfield f the value pushed on the operand stack has a security level
equal or greater than ft(f) and the level k of the location (to prevent explicit flows)
and equal or greater than se(i) for implicit flows.
— The transfer rule for newarray creates a new security level for the new created array,
combining the length level k and the content level at(i).
— The transfer rule for arraylength only uses the length level k of the extended level
k[kc] found on top of the stack type to give a security level to the length of an array.
— The transfer rule for arrayload pushes on top of the stack a security level (k1 ⊔
k2)⊔extkc. The join operation ⊔ext ∈ S × Sext → Sext is defined by k′⊔extk = k′ ⊔ k
when k, k′ ∈ S and k′⊔extk[kc] = (k
′ ⊔ k)[kc] when k, k
′ ∈ S and kc ∈ S
ext. Here k1
allows to prevent implicit flows through a high index and k2 through alias.
The following example illustrates this first point. It corresponds to a source program
like
int xL = aL[L][iH];
Let xL be a low variable, aL[L] a low array variable (both for reference and content
levels) and iH a high integer variable.
load aL[L]
load iH
arrayload
store xL
In this program, if the low array aL[L] contains distinct elements at different positions,
an attacker could learn the value of iH by looking at the result of aL[L][iH]. This
program is rejected by our type system because aL[L][iH] receives a type H in the
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arrayload rule and storing a high value in a low variable is impossible thanks to the
store rule.
The second point corresponds to an access aH[L][iL] where aH[L] may be either aliased to
a low array a0
L[L] containing only the 0 integer or aliased to a low array a
1
L[L] containing
only the integer 1. Hence observing the value of aH[L][iL] would allow an attacker to
know which of this array is aliased to aH[L].
— The transfer rule for arraystore uses the partial order ≤ext previously defined. It con-
strains k1 and kc to prevent an explicit flow from a high value to an array declared
with a low content. It constrains also k2 and kc to prevent information leak by up-
dating a low array content with a high index. Without it, an assignment of the form
aL[L][iH] = 1 in a low array aL[L] only containing the integer 0 would reveal the value
of iH.
Finally, the constraint between k3 and kc prevents modifying low array contents if its
reference is high. This is for example necessary if an array aH[L] may be aliased to two
distinct low array a0
L[L] and a
1
L[L]. Observing which of these low arrays is modified by
side effect of the affectation aH[L][iL] = vL would allow an attacker to learn which of
these arrays is effectively equal to aH[L].
4.4. Type system soundness
As for the JVMI , the type system is sound, in the sense that if a program is typable
then it is non-interferent.
Theorem 4.6. Let P be a typable JVMO program w.r.t. the safe CDR (region, jun)
and with a signature ~kv −→ kr. Then P is non-interferent with respect to the policy
associated with ~kv −→ kr.
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5. JVMC: The Method Extension of JVMO
The purpose of this section is to extend our analysis to methods. The extension is com-
patible with bytecode verification, in the sense that the analysis is modular.
5.1. Programs, memory model, and operational semantics
Programs Each program comes equipped with a set M of method names, and a set C
of classes, as in JVMO. The set of classes is now organised as a hierarchy to model the
class inheritance relation. This hierarchy will be used to resolve virtual calls.
Each method m possesses a list of instructions Pm. For simplicity, we impose that
all methods return a value. The set of instructions of JVMO is extended with the new
instruction invokevirtualmID for calling a virtual method. HeremID is a method identifier
which may correspond to several methods in the class hierarchy according to overriding
of methods. We assume there is a function lookupP attached to each program P that
takes a method identifier and a class name and returns the method to be executed.
States While JVM states contain a frame stack to handle method invocations, it is con-
venient for showing the correctness of static analyses to rely on an equivalent, so-called
mix-step semantics, where method invocation is performed in one big step transition.
Thus, a JVMC state is defined as in JVMO.
Operational semantics The mix-step operational semantics for method calls fully evalu-
ates those calls from an initial state to a return value and uses it to continue the current
computation. The semantic rules are given in Figure 9. As it can be seen in the first rule,
the semantics of instructions is like in JVMO, except for the new instruction invokevirtual,
whose semantics is given by the second rule. The location l is used to resolve the virtual
call. Thanks to the class of l and the identifier mID, a method m
′ is found in the class
hierarchy (through the lookup operator). The transitive closure of ;m is then used to
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Pm[i] 6= invokevirtual mID 〈i, ρ, os, h〉 ;JVMO 〈i
′, ρ′, os′, h′〉
〈i, ρ, os, h〉 ;m 〈i
′, ρ′, os′, h′〉
Pm[i] = invokevirtual mID m
′ = lookupP (mID, class(h(l)))
l ∈ dom(h)
〈1, {this 7→ l, ~x 7→ os1}, ǫ, h〉 ;
+
m′
v, h′
〈i, ρ, os1 :: l :: os2, h〉 ;m 〈i+ 1, ρ, v :: os2, h
′〉
Fig. 9. Operational Semantics for JVMC
obtain the result of the execution of m′. Execution of m′ is initialised with location l
for the reserved variable this and the elements of the operand stack os1 for the other
variables¶.
Successor relation We extend the successor relation of JVMO with the clause i 7→ i+ 1
for the new instruction invokevirtual. It illustrates our modular verification technique :
CDR is computed method by method.
5.2. Non-Interference
Non-interference for a JVMC program is given by local policies defined by security signa-
tures for every method and the same global policy mappings, ft and at, introduced for
JVMO.
Method signatures are standard (Myers, 1999; Banerjee and Naumann, 2005) and are
of the form ~kv
kh−→ kr, where ~kv provides the flow insensitive security level of all method
variables (being a parameter or not), and kr is the security level of the result of the
method. The heap effect level kh is needed to make a modular analysis. It represents
a lower bound for security levels of fields that are affected during the execution of the
method.
¶ We assume that all other variables used for local computation in the method are initialised by a
default value according to their type.
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A method is allowed to perform field updates only on fields whose level is greater than
kh. We formally define this notion of side effect preorder.
Definition 5.1 (Side effect preorder). Two heaps h1, h2 ∈ Heap are side effect pre-
ordered with respect to a security level k ∈ S (written as h1 k h2) if and only if
dom(h1) ⊆ dom(h2) and for all location l ∈ dom(h1) and all fields f ∈ F such that
k 6≤ ft(f), h1(l).f = h2(l).f .
This permits to define the notion of side-effect-safe method.
Definition 5.2. Amethodm is side-effect-safe with respect to a security level kh if for all
local variables in ρ ∈ X ⇀ V , all heaps h, h′ ∈ Heap and value v ∈ V , 〈1, ρ, ǫ, h〉;+m v, h
′
imply h kh h
′.
The notion of non-interferent method can be stated using the same indistinguishability
relation as in JVMO. A method m is called non-interferent for signature ~kv−→kr if for
any attacker level kobs and any two (normally) terminating executions initiated with
indistinguishable arguments according to ~kv and indistinguishable heaps according to
kobs and the global policy ft, the results are indistinguishable by kr and their heaps are
indistinguishable according to the global policy.
Definition 5.3 (Non-interferent JVMC method). A method m is non-interferent
w.r.t. a policy ~kv−→kr, if for every attacker level kobs and every partial function β ∈ L⇀
L and every ρ1, ρ2 ∈ X ⇀ V , h1, h2, h′1, h
′
2 ∈ Heap, v1, v2 ∈ V such that 〈1, ρ1, ǫ, h1〉;
+
m
v1, h
′
1, 〈1, ρ2, ǫ, h2〉 ;
∗
m v2, h
′
2 and h1 ∼kobs,β h2, ρ1 ∼ ~kv,kobs,β ρ2, there exists a partial
function β′ ∈ L ⇀ L such that β ⊆ β′, h′1 ∼kobs,β′ h
′
2 and moreover, if kr ≤ kobs then
v1 ∼β′ v2.
Then, a method is secure if it is side-effect safe and non-interferent.
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Definition 5.4 (Secure JVMC method). A method m is secure w.r.t. a policy ~kv
kh−→
kr if m is side-effect-safe with respect to kh and m is non-interferent with respect to
~kv−→kr.
Let Γ be a table of method signatures. This table associates to each method identifier‖
mID and security level k ∈ S, a security signature Γm[k]. This signature gives the security
policy of the method m called on object of level k (as in (Banerjee and Naumann,
2005) for source programs). The set of security signatures of a method m is defined as
PoliciesΓ(m) = { Γm[k] | k ∈ S }. Note that for coherence, each Γm[k] should give type
k to its local variable this. In the rest of the paper Γ will often be left implicit. We use
it to define the notion of secure program.
Definition 5.5 (Secure JVMC program). A program is secure with respect to a table
of method signatures Γ if for all its method m, m is safe with respect to all policies in
PoliciesΓ(m).
Example 5.6. Let P be a program that includes a method m and a class C with field
f . Let m have variables xH , yL and a unique security signature H,L
H
−→ H . We assume
that ft(f) = H with respect to the global mapping ft.
‖ Associating signatures with method identifiers instead of methods allows to enforce that method
overriding preserves declared security signatures.
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If the code of m is defined by:
new C
store yL
load xH
ifeq l1
load yL
push 1
putfield f
l1 : load yL
getfield f
return
then methodm is non-interferent because: starting from equal values for yL (yL represents
the low part of the state as stated by the security signature), the low part of the memory
is not modified at all during the execution of m. There are no assignments to the low
fields: this respects the high write effect of the method required by the policy.
5.3. Typing rules
The information flow type system enforces a method-wise verification strategy, using
method signatures in the transfer rule for method invocation. All typing rules are those
of the JVMO typing rules, except for putfield which needs a modification and the virtual
call rule which is new. These two rules are given in Figure 10.
Concerning putfield only one constraint is added w.r.t. the previous JVMO rule. The
new constraint kh ≤ ft(f) restricts modification of fields to those fields whose security
level is greater than the heap effect of the current method.
The typing rule for virtual call contains several constraints. The heap effect level of
the called method is constrained in several ways. The goal of the constraint k ≤ k′h is to
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Pm[i] = putfield f k1 ⊔ se(i) ⊔ k2 ≤ ft(f) kh ≤ ft(f)
region, se, ~ka
kh−→ kr , i ⊢ k1 :: k2 :: st ⇒ st
Pm[i] = invokevirtual mID ΓmID [k] =
~k′a
k′
h−→ k′r
k ⊔ kh ⊔ se(i) ≤ k
′
h length(st1) = nbArguments(mID)
k ≤ ~k′a[0] ∀i ∈ [0, length(st1)− 1], st1[length(st1)− i] ≤
~k′a[i + 1]
region, se, ~ka
kh−→ kr, i ⊢ st1 :: k :: st2 ⇒ (k
′
r ⊔ k ⊔ se(i)) :: st2
Fig. 10. New transfer rules for instructions of JVMC
avoid invocation of methods with low effect on the heap with high target objects. Two
different target objects (in two executions) may mean that the body of the method to
be executed is different in each execution. If the effect of the method is low (kh ≤ kobs),
then low memory is differently modified in both executions, leading to information leak.
The constraint se(i) ≤ k′h prevents implicit flows (low assignment in high regions) during
the execution of the called method. The constraint kh ≤ k′h prevents the called method
from updating field with a level lower that kh. The security level of the return value is
(k′r ⊔ k ⊔ se(i)). The security level k
′
r in (k
′
r ⊔ k ⊔ se(i)), obtained from the signature of
mID , prevents that its result flows to variables or fields with lower security level. The
security level k prevents flows due to execution of two distinct methods.
We include here an example that illustrates how object-oriented features can lead to
interference. We refer to (Banerjee and Naumann, 2005) for further examples.
Example 5.7. Let class C be a super class of a class D. Let method foo be declared in
D, and a method m declared in C and overridden in D as illustrated by the following
source program††:
†† We omit the call of the initializer.
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class C {
int m() {return 0; }
}
class D extends C {
int m() {return 1; }
int foo(boolean yH) {return (yH ? new C() : this).m(); }
}
D.foo : C.m : D.m :
load yH push 0 push 1
ifeq l1 return return
new C
goto l2
l1 : load this
l2 : invokevirtual m
return
At run time, either code C.m or code D.m is executed depending on the value of high
variable yH . Information about yH may be inferred by observing the return value of
method m.
Finally, we define typability of programs.
Definition 5.8 (Typable JVMC program). A JVMC program is typable w.r.t. safe
CDRs (regionm, junm) and with table of signatures Γ iff all methods m in P are typable
w.r.t. (regionm, junm) and all signatures in PoliciesΓ(m).
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5.4. Type system soundness
As for the JVMI and JVMO, the type system is sound, in the sense that if a program is
typable then it is secure.
Theorem 5.9. Let P be a typable JVMC program w.r.t. safe CDRs (regionm, junm) and
with table of signatures Γ. Then P is secure with respect to Γ.
6. JVME : The exception-handling extension of JVMC
In this section we show how JVMC is extended with an exception handling mecha-
nism. Exceptions introduce several potential sources of information leakage; in particu-
lar, attackers may infer sensitive information from the termination mode of programs.
This possibility must be reflected both in the notion of state indistinguishability, and of
method signatures, which become significantly more complex (Myers, 1999).
Exceptions have an enormous impact on the control flow graph of programs, since
many instructions become branching instructions. Thus, exceptions move the control
flow graph from being an un-labelled directed graph to being a labelled directed graph,
where the labels are either Norm (labels that do not correspond to any exception branch)
or C (for an exception class C). The CDR analysis is then redefined in a labelled fashion,
i.e. region(i, C) and jun(i, C).
Curbing this explosion in the control flow graph is essential for maintaining a minimum
of precision in the information flow analysis; therefore, our analysis is parametrised by a
pre-analysis (PA) that detects branches that will never be taken. The PA analyser may
perform analyses of null pointers (to predict unthrowable null pointer exceptions), classes
(to predict target of throws instructions), array accesses (to predict unthrowable out-of-
bounds exceptions), and exceptions (to over-approximate the set of throwable exceptions
for each method).
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The extension of the type system to multiple exceptions is achieved by a fine-grained
definition of control dependence regions that is parametrised by a class-analysis and an
exception-analysis (which is part of the PA analyser). For the soundness of the informa-
tion flow type system, we assume that both the class-analysis and the exception-analysis
are in the Trusted Computing Base. Thus, the type system exploits the information of
the class analysis and signature of methods (that coincides with the exception-analysis
results) to add constraints on the security environment according to adequate regions for
the type of escaping exceptions.
6.1. Programs, memory model and operational semantics
Programs The instruction set of the JVMC is extended with the bytecode throw. We
assume that programs come equipped with a partial function Handlerm : PP × C ⇀ PP
that for each method m selects the appropriate handler for a given program point. If an
exception of class C ∈ C is thrown at program point i ∈ PP then, if Handlerm(i, C) = t,
then the control will be transferred to program point t, and if Handlerm(i, C) is undefined
(written as Handlerm(i, C) ↑), the exception is uncaught in method m. In the first case
the operand stack is reset to a singleton with the exception object on its top.
States JVME states include JVMC states and extend them with new final states. We
model final states as (V +L)×Heap: a final state is either of the form (v, h) ∈ V ×Heap
for normal termination, or of the form (〈l〉, h) ∈ L × Heap for abrupt termination by an
uncaught exception pointed by a location l in the heap h.
Operational semantics We give in Figure 11 the semantics of some exception-throwing
instructions in JVME . (For brevity, we refrain from listing exceptional rules for getfield,
putfield, arraylength, arrayload, arraystore). There are three exceptional rules for the virtual
call instruction. The first and the second model the cases when execution of the called
G. Barthe, D. Pichardie and T. Rezk 48
method terminates by an uncaught exception. In the first rule the thrown exception is
caught in method m while in the second rule it is uncaught andm then terminates abnor-
mally. In both cases, we impose that the thrown exception has been statically predicted
by the excAnalysis(mID) result of the exception analysis
‡‡. The third rule corresponds to
a null pointer exception thrown because the virtual call occurred on a null reference. We
use np as the class associated to the null pointer exception. When a native exception np
is thrown the catching mechanism is modelled by the function RuntimeExceptionHandling.
Each instruction which performs an access on a reference (getfield f , putfield f and throw,
arraylength, arrayload, arraystore) has a similar semantics. The last two rules concern the
new instruction throw which throws the exception pointed by the reference on top of the
stack. Transitions are now parametrised by a tag τ ∈ {Norm}+ C to describe the nature
of the transition (see the successor relation below). We will sometimes omit the tag τ in
the notation ;m,τ for clarity.
Successor relation The successor relation is now decorated by an element (called tag)
in {Norm} + C in order to reflect the nature of the underlying semantics step: Norm for
a normal step (as in JVMC) and c ∈ C for a step where an exception of class C has
been thrown. The definition of this new relation is given in Figure 12. This relation can
be statically computed thanks to the handler function of each method. Successors of
a throw instruction are approximated by the class analysis result and successors of an
invokevirtual are approximated by the exception analysis result of the called method.
‡‡ This hypothesis is directly put as precondition of the semantics rules, in the same way that only well-
typed states are considered when assuming a program is bytecode verified. It is straightforward to
show that our instrumented semantics coincides with the standard semantics if the exception analysis
is semantically safe.
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〈i, ρ, os, h〉 ;m 〈i
′, ρ′, os′, h′〉 in JVMC semantics
〈i, ρ, os, h〉 ;m,Norm 〈i
′, ρ′, os′, h′〉
Pm[i] = invokevirtual mID m
′ = lookupP (mID, class(h(l)))
l ∈ dom(h) 〈1, {this 7→ l, ~x 7→ os1}, ǫ, h〉 ;
+
m′
〈l′〉, h′
e = class(h′(l′)) Handlerm(i, e) = t e ∈ excAnalysis(mID)
〈i, ρ, os1 :: l :: os2, h〉 ;m,e 〈t, ρ, l
′ :: ǫ, h′〉
Pm[i] = invokevirtual mID m
′ = lookupP (mID, class(h(l)))
l ∈ dom(h) 〈1, {this 7→ l, ~x 7→ os1}, ǫ, h〉 ;
+
m′
〈l′〉, h′
e = class(h′(l′)) Handlerm(i, e) ↑ e ∈ excAnalysis(mID)
〈i, ρ, os1 :: l :: os2, h〉 ;m,e 〈l
′〉, h′
Pm[i] = invokevirtual mID l
′ = fresh(h)
〈i, ρ, os1 :: null :: os2, h〉 ;m,np RuntimeExceptionHandling(h, l
′,np, i, ρ)
Pm[i] = throw l
′ = fresh(h)
〈i, ρ, null :: s, h〉 ;m,np RuntimeExceptionHandling(h, l
′,np, i, ρ)
Pm[i] = throw l ∈ dom(h) e = class(h(l))
Handlerm(i, e) = t e ∈ classAnalysis(m, i)
〈i, ρ, l :: os, h〉 ;m,e 〈t, ρ, l :: ǫ, h〉
Pm[i] = throw l ∈ dom(h) e = class(h(l))
Handlerm(i, e) ↑ e ∈ classAnalysis(m, i)
〈i, ρ, l :: os, h〉 ;m,e 〈l〉, h
with RuntimeExceptionHandling : Heap× L× C × PP × (X ⇀ V) → State + (L × Heap) defined by
RuntimeExceptionHandling(h, l′, C, i, ρ) =
{
〈t, ρ, l′ :: ǫ, h⊕{l′ 7→ default(C)}〉 if Handlerm(i, C) = t
〈l′〉, h⊕{l′ 7→ default(C)} if Handlerm(i, C) ↑
Fig. 11. New operational semantics rules for JVME
i 7→JVMC j
i 7→Norm j
i 7→JVMC
i 7→Norm
Pm[i] ∈ {getfield f, putfield f, throw, invokevirtual, arraylength, arrayload, arraystore} Handler(i,np) = t
i 7→np t
Pm[i] ∈ {getfield f, putfield f, throw, invokevirtual, arraylength, arrayload, arraystore} Handler(i,np) ↑
i 7→np
Pm[i] = throw C ∈ classAnalysis(m, i) Handler(i, C) = t
i 7→C t
Pm[i] = throw C ∈ classAnalysis(m, i) Handler(i, C) ↑
i 7→C
Pm[i] = invokevirtual mID C ∈ excAnalysis(mID) Handler(i, C) = t
i 7→C t
Pm[i] = invokevirtual mID C ∈ excAnalysis(mID) Handler(i, C) ↑
i 7→C
Fig. 12. Successor relation for JVME
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CDR properties CDR results are now associated not only with program points but also
with tags:
regionm : PP × ({Norm}+ C)→ ℘(PP) junm : PP × ({Norm}+ C)⇀ PP
We call return point a point i such that there exists τ ∈ {Norm} + C with i 7→τ . When
possible we will write i 7→ j for ∃τ, i 7→τ j.
CDR1: for all program points i, j, k and tag τ such that i 7→ j, i 7→τ k and j 6= k (i is
hence a branching point), k ∈ region(i, τ) or k = jun(i, τ);
CDR2: for all program points i, j, k and tag τ , if j ∈ region(i, τ) and j 7→ k, then either
k ∈ region(i, τ) or k = jun(i, τ);
CDR3: for all program points i, j and tag τ , if j ∈ region(i, τ) and j is a return point
then jun(i, τ) is undefined;
CDR4: for all program points i and tags τ1, τ2, if jun(i, τ1) and jun(i, τ2) are defined and
jun(i, τ1) 6= jun(i, τ2) then jun(i, τ1) ∈ region(i, τ2) or jun(i, τ2) ∈ region(i, τ1);
CDR5: for all program points i, j and tag τ , if j ∈ region(i, τ) and j is a return point
then for all tag τ ′ such that jun(i, τ ′) is defined, jun(i, τ ′) ∈ region(i, τ).
CDR6: for all program point i and tag τ1, if i 7→τ1 then for all tag τ2, region(i, τ2) ⊆
region(i, τ1) and if jun(i, τ2) is defined, jun(i, τ2) ∈ region(i, τ1).
Junction points uniquely delimits ends of regions. CDR1 expresses that successors of
branching points belongs (or ends) the region associated with the same kind as their
successor relation. CDR2 says that a successor of a point in a region is either still in the
same region or at this end. CDR3 forbids junction points for a region which contains a
return point. CDR4 and CDR5 express properties between regions of a same program
point but with different tags. CDR4 says that if two differently tagged regions end in
distinct points, the junction point of one must belong to the region of the other. CDR5
imposes that the junction point of a region must be within every region which contains
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a return point and is decorated with a different tag. CDR6 imposes that a return point i
of tag τ1 has a region region(i, τ1) large enough to contain all the others regions (and the
eventual junction points) that are attached to i. CDR6 can be seen as an extension of
CDR5 for the case j = i. Any region that contains a return point or start at an ending
point must contain all other regions.
Figure 13 presents an example of safe CDR for an abstract transition system.
i
E2
region(i, E1)
region(i, ∅)
jun(i, E2)
jun(i, E1)
region(i, E2)
E1 ∅
jun(i, ∅)
Fig. 13. Example of CDR in JVME . Only relevant tags are presented here.
6.2. Non-Interference
Method signatures are now of the form
~kv
kh−→ ~kr
where ~kv, kh are defined as in JVMC . (In the rest of the paper we will write ~kr[n] instead
of kn and ~kr[ei] instead of kei .) The security level
~kr (called output level) is now a list of
security levels of the form {Norm : kn, e1 : ke1 , . . . en : ken}, where kn is the security level
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of the return value and ei is an exception class that might be propagated by the method
in a security environment (or due to an exception-throwing instruction) of level ki.
The notion of output indistinguishability is adapted accordingly.
Definition 6.1 (Output indistinguishability). Given an attacker level kobs, a partial
function β ∈ L⇀ L, an output level ~kr, indistinguishability of two final states in method
m is defined by the clauses:
h1 ∼kobs,β h2
~kr[n] ≤ kobs ⇒ v1 ∼β v2
(v1, h1) ∼kobs,β, ~kr (v2, h2)
h1 ∼kobs,β h2 (class(h1(l1)) : k) ∈
~kr k ≤ kobs l1 ∼β l2
(〈l1〉, h1) ∼kobs,β, ~kr (〈l2〉, h2)
h1 ∼kobs,β h2 (class(h1(l1)) : k) ∈
~kr k 6≤ kobs
(〈l1〉, h1) ∼kobs,β, ~kr (v2, h2)
h1 ∼kobs,β h2 (class(h2(l2)) : k) ∈
~kr k 6≤ kobs
(v1, h1) ∼kobs,β, ~kr (〈l2〉, h2)
h1 ∼kobs,β h2 (class(h1(l1)) : k1) ∈
~kr (class(h2(l2)) : k2) ∈ ~kr
k1 6≤ kobs k2 6≤ kobs
(〈l1〉, h1) ∼kobs,β, ~kr (〈l2〉, h2)
In each case, heaps must be indistinguishable. This definition implies that if indistin-
guishability outputs are of different nature (like normal value/exception or two excep-
tions from different classes) the security level of the corresponding exception must be high
in the output signature ~kr. When outputs are of similar nature (two normal values or
two exceptions of the same class) they are indistinguishable as soon as the corresponding
security level in ~kr is low.
The previous definition and the next definition of non-interference rely on indistin-
guishability definitions already proposed for the JVMO (at page 33).
Definition 6.2 (Non-interferent JVME method). A method m is non-interferent
w.r.t. a policy ~kv−→ ~kr, if for every attacker level kobs, every partial function β ∈ L⇀ L
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and every ρ1, ρ2 ∈ X ⇀ V , h1, h2, h′1, h
′
2 ∈ Heap, r1, r2 ∈ V+L such that 〈1, ρ1, ǫ, h1〉;
+
m
r1, h
′
1, 〈1, ρ2, ǫ, h2〉 ;
+
m r2, h
′
2 and h1 ∼kobs,β h2, ρ1 ∼ ~kv,kobs,β ρ2, there exists a partial
function β′ ∈ L⇀ L such that β ⊆ β′ and (r1, h
′
1) ∼kobs,β′, ~kr (r2, h
′
2).
Like in JVMC , we impose a side-effect-safe (c.f. page 41 for a formal definition) on
methods. This notion is used when virtual call occurs in a high context in order to
enforce that no modification is done on low information during the execution of the
called method.
Definition 6.3 (Secure JVME method). A method m is secure w.r.t. a policy ~kv
kh−→
~kr if m is side-effect-safe with respect to kh and m is non-interferent with respect to
~kv−→ ~kr.
Definition 6.4 (Secure JVME program). A program is secure with respect to a table
of method signature Γ if for all its method m, m is secure with respect to all policies in
PoliciesΓ(m)
§§.
6.3. Typing rules
Typing rules for JVMC are extended (and modified in the case of ifeq and invokevirtual)
with rules given in Figure 14. These rules concern only exception-throwing and branching
instructions. Rules for other instructions are as in JVMC .
The rule for ifeq is updated to flag with Norm the region that it considers. The virtual
call needs now three typing rules. The first one corresponds to a normal control flow
edge from the call site to its successor in the calling method. It is very similar to the rule
in JVMC except that invokevirtual is now a branching instruction because of the various
exceptions that may be thrown at this point. We rely on the information excAnalysis(mID)
§§ PoliciesΓ(m) has been defined on page 42.
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Pm[i] = ifeq j ∀j
′ ∈ region(i,Norm), k ≤ se(j′)
Γ, region, se, ~ka
kh−→ ~kr, i ⊢
Norm k :: st⇒ liftk(st)
Pm[i] = return k ⊔ se(i) ≤ ~kr [n]
Γ, region, se, ~ka
kh−→ ~kr , i ⊢
Norm k :: st⇒
Pm[i] = invokevirtual mID ΓmID [k] =
~k′a
k′
h−→ ~k′r
k ⊔ kh ⊔ se(i) ≤ k
′
h length(st1) = nbArguments(mID)
k ≤ ~k′a[0] ∀i ∈ [0, length(st1) − 1], st1[i] ≤
~k′a[i + 1]
ke =
⊔{
~k′r [e] | e ∈ excAnalysis(mID)
}
∀j ∈ region(i,Norm), k ⊔ ke ≤ se(j)
Γ, region, se, ~ka
kh−→ ~kr, i ⊢
Norm
st1 :: k :: st2 ⇒ liftk⊔ke
(
( ~k′r[n] ⊔ se(i)) :: st2
)
Pm[i] = invokevirtual mID ΓmID [k] =
~k′a
k′
h−→ ~k′r
k ⊔ kh ⊔ se(i) ≤ k
′
h length(st1) = nbArguments(mID)
k ≤ ~k′a[0] ∀i ∈ [0, length(st1) − 1], st1[i] ≤
~k′a[i + 1]
e ∈ excAnalysis(mID) ⊔ {np} ∀j ∈ region(i, e), k ⊔ ~k′r[e] ≤ se(j) Handler(i, e) = t
Γ, region, se, ~kv
kh−→ ~kr , i ⊢
e
st1 :: k :: st2 ⇒ (k ⊔ ~k′r[e]) :: ε
Pm[i] = invokevirtual mID ΓmID [k] =
~k′v
k′
h−→ ~k′r
k ⊔ kh ⊔ se(i) ≤ k
′
h length(st1) = nbArguments(mID)k ≤
~k′v [0]
∀i ∈ [0, length(st1)− 1], st1[i] ≤ ~k′v [i+ 1] e ∈ excAnalysis(mID) ⊔ {np}
k ⊔ se(i) ⊔ ~k′r [e] ≤
~kr [e] ∀j ∈ region(i, e), k ⊔ ~k′r [e] ≤ se(j) Handler(i, e) ↑
Γ, region, se, ~kv
kh−→ ~kr , i ⊢
e
st1 :: k :: st2 ⇒
Pm[i] = throw e ∈ classAnalysis(i) ∪ {np}
∀j ∈ region(i, e), k ≤ se(j) Handler(i, e) = t
Γ, region, se, ~kv
kh−→ ~kr , i ⊢
e k :: st ⇒ k ⊔ se(i) :: ǫ
Pm[i] = throw e ∈ classAnalysis(i) ∪ {np}
k ≤ ~kr [e] ∀j ∈ region(i, e), k ≤ se(j) Handler(i, e) ↑
Γ, region, se, ~kv
kh−→ ~kr , i ⊢
e k :: st ⇒
Fig. 14. Transfer rules for instructions of JVME
to compute the level upper bound ke of all exceptions that may be thrown by the method.
The level ke and the level k of the receiver object (that may be null and may throw a null
pointer exception at runtime) are used to constrain the security environment and the next
stack type. The second and third rules are parametrised by any exception e that may be
thrown by mID. The second rule corresponds to the case where the exception is caught
at the caller site, while the third rule corresponds to the case where the exception is not
caught there. In each of these rules, the level ~k′r[e] is used to constrain the corresponding
region region(i, e).
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Observe that the typing judgement is now parametrised by a tag τ ∈ {Norm} + C.
It will be used to describe without ambiguity which typing constraint must be verified
according to the kind of execution performed in the semantics.
This notion of tag requires to update the notion of typable method.
Definition 6.5 (Typable method). A method m is typable w.r.t. a method signature
table Γ, a global field policy ft, a policy sgn, and a CDR regionm : PP → ℘(PP) if there
exists a security environment se : PP → S and a function S : PP → S⋆ such that S1 = ε
and for all i, j ∈ PP , e ∈ {Norm}+ C:
1 i 7→e j implies there exists st ∈ S⋆ such that Γ, ft, region, se, sgn, i ⊢e Si ⇒ st and
st ⊑ Sj ;
2 i 7→e implies Γ, ft, region, se, sgn, i ⊢e Si ⇒
6.4. A typable example
Figure 15 presents an example of a typable method m, giving the corresponding source
code and the tagged flow graph. A method m may throw two kinds of exceptions: an
exception of class C depending on the value of x, and an exception of class np depending
on the values of x and y. Normal return depends on y because execution terminates
normally only if it is not null . The method m is typable with the policy m : (this : L, x :
L, y : H)
H
−→ {Norm : H, C : L, np : H} with the CDR (given only for branching
points), the type stacks and the security environment given in Figure 15.
Figure 16 gives another example¶¶ where fine grain exception handling is necessary
for the code to be typable. Here the update tL = 1 at point 6 is accepted if and only if
se(6) is low. This fragment is accepted by our type system since, thanks to the fine grain
¶¶ To keep the example short here we give a compressed version of the compiled code.
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int m(boolean x,C y) throws C
{
if (x) {throw new C();}
else {y.f = 3;};
return 1;
}
0 : load x
1 : ifeq 4
2 : new C
3 : throw
4 : load y
5 : push 3
6 : putfield f
7 : const 1
8 : return
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
∅
∅
∅
C
∅
∅
∅
np
∅
∅
∅
i S(i) se(i)
0 ε L
1 L :: ε L
2 ε L
3 L :: ε L
4 ε L
5 H :: ε L
6 L :: H :: ε L
7 ε H
8 H :: ε H
region(1,Norm) = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} jun(1,Norm) undef.
region(6,Norm) = ∅ jun(6,Norm) = 7 region(6,np) = {7, 8} jun(6,np) undef.
Fig. 15. Typable methods at source and bytecode level
regions, typing rule for virtual call only propagates exception levels ~kr[np] = H in the
region region(3,np) (instead of region(3, C)).
6.5. Type system soundness
We finish this section by stating the type soundness theorem for JVME .
Theorem 6.6. Let P be a JVME typable program w.r.t. safe CDRs (regionm, junm) and
a table of signatures Γ. Then P is secure with respect to Γ.
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0 : load oL
1 : load yH
2 : load xL
3 : invokevirtual m
4 : store zH
5 : push 1
6 : store tL
handler : [0, 3],NullPointer→ 4
0 1 2
3
4
5
6
np
∅ ∅
∅
C
∅
∅
∅
i S(i) se(i)
0 ε L
1 L :: ε L
2 L :: L :: ε L
3 L :: H :: L :: ε L
4 H :: ε L
5 ε L
6 L :: ε L
region(3,Norm) = region(3,np) = ∅ jun(3,Norm) = jun(3,np) = 4
region(3, C) = {4, 5, 6, . . .} jun(3, C) undef.
Fig. 16. Typable fragment with virtual call
7. Machine-checked proof
We have formalized within the Coq proof assistant the information flow type system
for the JVME fragment, and proved formally its soundness. Moreover, we have formal-
ized executable checkers for the CDR properties and for typability, and proved formally
their soundness—in the sense that an annotated program that is accepted by the CDR
checker satisfies the CDR properties, and that an annotated program that is accepted by
the information flow checker is typable w.r.t. our type system and non-interferent. The
statement of soundness of the type system hinges on a formalization of the operational
semantics of the JVM, and of the notion of non-interferent program.
This section presents an overview of the proof. We start with a short discussion on the
relevance of formal proofs, and some statistics on the development. Then, we describe our
formalization of the semantics of the JVM and of the notion of non-interferent program.
Further, we discuss our approach for proving unwinding lemmas and for constructing
executable checkers. We conclude with an example.
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7.1. Motivation and overview
Our formalization participates to an increasing trend of using proof assistants for building
machine-checked proofs of the metatheory of programming languages (Aydemir et al.,
2005). One primary motivation for using proof assistants is that they provide significant
help for managing satisfactorily the complexity of type soundness proofs. In our view, the
complexity of information flow type systems for full-fledged languages makes machine-
checked formalizations extremely important, if not compulsory, for three concommitting
reasons. First, the formalization of the operational semantics contains a significant num-
ber of rules; for example, the JVM virtual call has 5 different transitions (call on a null
reference which generates a null pointer exception that may be caught or not, normal ter-
mination of the callee, termination by an exception that may be caught or not in the caller
context). Second, the type system contains over 60 rules, and many rules have a large
(up to 10) number of premises, see e.g. Figure 14. Third, the proof of non-interference
relies on unwinding lemmas that require reasoning about two program executions, lead-
ing to a very large number of cases in proofs. Moreover, the proof of correctness of the
type system is stratified: one must first prove that the CDR checker is correct (assuming
that the pre-annotations are), then prove that the type system is correct (assuming that
the pre-annotations and CDR checker are)—we do not provide a means to check the
correctness of pre-annotations; this is left for future work. Summarizing, we have proved
the following theorem; the second part corresponds to the Theorem 6.6.
Theorem 7.1.
1 CDR and IF can be checked by executable functions.
2 For every annotated program P ,
PA(P ) ∧ CDR(P ) ∧ IF(P ) =⇒ SAFE(P )
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where:
— the security condition is formalized by the predicate SAFE;
— the correctness of program annotations is formalized by the predicate PA;
— the CDR properties (given in Section 6) are formalized by the predicate CDR;
— the notion of typable program is formalized by the IF predicate.
Foundational Proof-Carrying Code (Appel, 2001) provides another motivation for
machine-checked proofs: a certified checker can be used to reduce the Trusted Com-
puting Base of a security architecture for mobile code. Figure 17 describes how our type
system would operate in a Proof-Carrying Code scenario. The left-hand side of the figure
corresponds to the code producer, which should produce a certificate in the form of the
results of the PA, CDR, and IF analyzers. Our formalization focuses on the right-hand
side of the figure, which corresponds to the code consumer:
1 the PA checker verifies that annotations provided by the PA analyzer are correct;
2 the CDR checker verifies that regions provided by the CDR analyzer verify the safe
over-approximation properties of Section 6;
3 the IF checker verifies type correctness in the style of lightweight bytecode verification.
One virtue of Foundational Proof Carrying Code is that it yields a significantly simpler
Trusted Computed Base: specifically, the Trusted Computing Base is reduced to the
Coq type checker and the formal definition of non-interference, as shown in Figure 18—
contrast with Figure 17 where formal proofs were not mentioned.
The full Coq development is about 17,000 lines; its main components are: the opera-
tional semantics of the JVM, the definition of the type system, and the proof of soundness
of the type system. Each of them is a significant formalization in itself; Figure 19 gives
indications on the size of the components. The development is available at
http://www.irisa.fr/celtique/pichardie/ext/iflow/
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TCB
program
PA analyser
CDR analyser
IF analyser
PA checker
CDR checker
IF checker
diagnostic
annotations
annotations
annotations
Fig. 17. Information flow analyzer and checker
program
PA analyser
CDR analyser
IF analyser
PA checker
CDR checker
IF checker
diagnostic
annotations
annotations
annotations
Coq
+
Bicolano
+
Non-Interference
definition
TCB
proof
Fig. 18. Information flow analyser and checker with Coq TCB
7.2. Formal semantics
The development relies on a formal semantics of the JVM in Coq, called Bicolano, which
has been developed within the Mobius project to serve as a common basis for certification
of proof carrying code technologies in Coq. Bicolano closely follows the official JVM
specification—although some features are omitted, e.g. initialization, subroutines, multi-
threading, dynamic class loading, garbage collection, 64-bit arithmetic and floats.
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Line of code
JVM semantics (Bicolano), bytecode program manipulation tools 4287
Non-Interference type checker
General non-interference proof 942
Unwinding lemmas 3527
Typing rules (definitions, properties, checker) 5236
Indistinguishability 2157
CDR checker 1003
Total 17152
Fig. 19. Size of the Coq development
The core of Bicolano is a small-step operational semantics which describes the dynamic
behavior of a bytecode program according to the JVM specification. The small-step
semantics is formalized as an inductively defined relation · → · between states of the
virtual machine, where a state consists of a heap, and a stack frame; Figure 20 presents
the small-step semantics for method calls and return. In addition, Bicolano formalizes a
mix-step semantics, in which method calls are performed in one step—as in Section 5;
in particular, the mix-step semantics for virtual method invocation appears in Figure 9
(page 40). The mix-step semantics is also formalized as an inductively defined relation
· → · between states of the virtual machine, but uses a simplified notion of state in which
the stack frame is replaced by a single frame. Both semantics are equivalent, in the sense
that the big-step semantics induced by the two semantics coincide; Bicolano formally
establishes this equivalence between them. The crux of the proof is a lemma stating that
each execution of the JVM to a final value implies the corresponding judgment of the
mix-step semantics.


〈h, [m, pc, ρ, os ], ε〉 →∗ 〈h′, [m, pc′, ρ′, v′ :: os ′], ε〉
with Pm[pc
′] = return

 =⇒ 〈h, pc, l, s〉;+m (h′, v′)
A similar lemma is necessary for execution terminating with an uncaught exception.
We briefly comment on the role of the two semantics in our work: the mix-step seman-
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tics brings important simplifications in the definition of state indistinguishability and in
the soundness proofs, and hence we use it to machine-check type soundness. The small-
step semantics serves as a reference formalization, and hence the final theorem is stated
using the small-step semantics.
Pm[i] = invokevirtual mID m
′ = lookupP (mID, class(h(l)))
l ∈ dom(h) length(os1) = nbArguments(mID)
f ′ = [m′, 1, {this 7→ l, ~x 7→ os1}, ε] f ′′ = [m, pc, ρ, os2]
〈h, [m, pc, ρ, l :: os1 :: os2], sf 〉 → 〈h, f ′, f ′′ :: sf 〉
instrAt(m, pc, return)
〈h, [m, pc, ρ, v :: os ], [m′, pc′, ρ′, os ′] :: sf 〉 → 〈h, [m′, pc′ + 1, ρ′, v :: os ′], sf 〉
Fig. 20. Small-step semantics rule for virtual method call
For the purpose of the information-flow type system, we have also developed an in-
strumented semantics of annotated programs. In such an instrumented semantics, extra
properties taken from annotation information are assumed in the premise of the transi-
tion rules. Figure 21 gives an example of instrumented transition. Annotations take the
form of flags safe attached to program points where the pre-analyzer predicts that no
exception may be thrown here; moreover, the instrumented semantics constrains that ex-
ceptions can only be raised at program points which are not annotated as safe. Assuming
that the annotations are correct, the mix-step semantics and the instrumented mix-step
semantics coincide.
〈h, pc, l, s〉;+m (h
′, v′) ∧ Sound(annot) =⇒ 〈h, pc, l, s〉;annot+m (h
′, v′)
Pm[i] = getfield f l
′ = fresh(h) annotm[i] 6= safe
〈i, ρ, null :: os , h〉;m,np RuntimeExceptionHandling(h, l′,np, i, ρ)
Fig. 21. Example of annotated semantic rule
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7.3. Formalization of the security condition
The definition of non-interferent program, and the proof of soundness of the type system,
rely on the notion of state indistinguishability. The main issue with the formalization
of the latter is the notion of finite bijection used to relate heaps in the two program
executions. Instead of parametrizing state indistinguishability by a finite bijection β
from A to A, we have found it more convenient to parametrize the definition by a pair
of finite functions (β1, β2) from natural numbers to A. Informally, the finite functions β1
and β2 are determined by the execution of the first and second programs respectively: β1
is extended when a new low object is created during execution of the first program, and
likewise for β2. This allows us to define an instrumented operational semantics in which
the partial function βi is part of the program state; see next subsection.
7.3.1. Finite maps A finite function from nat to A is modelled by the dependent type:
Record ffun (A:Type) : Set := make {
lookup :> nat -> option A;
domain_size : nat;
lookup_domain : forall n, n<domain_size <-> (lookup n<>None)
}.
Hence, an element of type ffun A is given by three elements: a partial function from nat-
ural numbers to A, modelled as a type-theoretical function lookup from natural numbers
to option A; a natural number domain size that gives the current size of the function
domain and a proof lookup domain that the domain of lookup is equal to the set of
the numbers smaller than domain size. In order to carry our reasoning, we have built a
library that includes operators and lemmas to manipulate and reason about finite maps.
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7.3.2. Indistinguishability relations We have formalized indistinguishability relations and
built a library of basic results to reason about indistinguishability—the library contains
more than 100 lemmas.
Indistinguishability relations are defined w.r.t. a pair of finite functions from natural
numbers to locations. As in the paper, the formalization defines indistinguishability in-
crementally for values, operand stacks, local variables, heaps and states. As an example
the signature for the heap indistinguishability relation is the following:
hp_in (newArT : Method * PC -> L.t’) (ft:FieldSignature -> L.t’)
(b b’: FFun.t Location) (h h’: Heap.t) : Prop
Here the parameter newArT gives the annotation for array allocation (one array content
type at each newarray location in the program). L.t’ is the type of information flow
types extended to arrays (see Section 4). The finite functions b and b’ correspond to
the partial bijection of the previous sections; the predicate hp in enforces that the two
functions satisfy some expected properties, e.g. being bijective.
7.4. Soundness proof methodology
The main technical artifact of the soundness proof is a (mix-step) defensive semantics
that keeps track of type information and partial bijections, and is particularly useful to
reason on well-typed executions.
The defensive semantics manipulate states of the form (in Coq syntax):
Inductive state : Type :=
| intra : IntraNormalState -> TypeStack -> ffun Location -> state
| ret : Heap.t -> ReturnVal -> ffun Location -> state.
The following Coq code presents the rule corresponding to object allocation.
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Inductive NormalStep_new (c:ClassName) (m:Method) (sgn:sign) :
IntraNormalState -> TypeStack -> ffun Location ->
IntraNormalState -> TypeStack -> ffun Location -> Prop :=
| new : forall h pc pc’ s l loc h’ st b,
next m pc = Some pc’ ->
Heap.new h p.(prog) (Heap.LocationObject c) = Some (pair loc h’) ->
NormalStep_new c m sgn
(pc,(h,s,l)) st b
(pc’,(h’,(Ref loc::s),l)) ((se pc)::st) (newb (se pc) b loc).
In this example, (pc,(h,s,l)) and (pc’,(h’,(Ref loc::s),l)) represent the (JVM)
states before and after executing the instruction, while st and ((se pc)::st) represent
the corresponding type stacks and b and (newb (se pc) b loc) are the partial bijec-
tions. The newb operator is used to extend the domain of a partial bijection depending
on the current security level (given here by (se pc)).
7.5. Executable checkers
The first item of Theorem 7.1 is proved by formalizing boolean-valued functions checkCDR
and checkIF that enforce the predicates CDR and IF respectively. The function checkCDR
performs a direct verification of the CDR properties for each method. What is left for
future work is to implement a verifier checkPA that entails PA.
Functions checkCDR and checkIF are executable Coq programs that have been success-
fully extracted into Ocaml. We have tested then on a Tax Calculation Java program
inspired from the case study proposed by Deng and Smith (Deng and Smith, 2004). The
full Java source program is given in Figure 22 with its information flow type annota-
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tions given in a Jif-like syntax, and safety annotations given in comments. The program
computes income taxes from an input array of taxable incomes and marital status. The
program takes as argument an array input of inputs and a tax table taxTable. Then,
for each index i in the array range, it performs a binary search to find an index lo such
that
taxTable[lo].brackets≤ input[i].taxableIncome< taxTable[lo+ 1].brackets
and updates the output array out.tax[i]with the computed tax (taxTable[lo].married
or taxTable[lo].single depending on the marital status) and increment a counter
out.married nb or out.single nb to count the whole number of married and single tax
returns. The taxable incomes (field taxableIncome) and the array content of the income
taxes (field tax) are given a high security level while other data are low.
We briefly comment on the annotations for runtime exceptions (NP means NullPointer,
NAS means NegativeArraySize, AOB means ArrayOutofBounds). Most of these annota-
tions can be easily proved with a simple null pointer analysis that maintains the invari-
ant this 6= null. The others require more complex arithmetic reasoning, for example a
relational numeric static analysis (Besson et al., 2010).
8. Conclusion
We have introduced a provably sound information flow type system for a fragment of
the JVM that includes objects, methods, exceptions, and arrays. To our best knowledge,
no previous work has provided a sound type system for such an expressive fragment
of the sequential JVM. In combination with our companion work on preservation of
information flow types by compilation (Barthe et al., 2006), our results provide a sound
basis for end-to-end security solutions for Java-based mobile code. The most immediate
direction for further work is to extend the type system to a concurrent fragment of
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class Output {
int{L} single_nb; int{L} married_nb; int[]{L[H]} tax;
Output{L}(int nbPeople) {
single_nb = 0; // no NP exception
married_nb = 0; // no NP exception
tax = new int[nbPeople]; // no NP exception, no NAS exception
}
void updateMarried{L}(int{L} i, int{H} tax_data) {
tax[i] = tax_data; // no NP exception, no AOB exception
married_nb++; // no NP exception
}
void updateSingle{L}(int{L} i, int{H} tax_data) {
tax[i] = tax_data; // no NP exception, no AOB exception
single_nb++; // no NP exception
}
}
class Input {int{H} taxableIncome; boolean{L} maritalStatus;}
class Tax {int{L} single; int{L} married; int{L} brackets;}
class TaxCalculation {
Output{L} main{L}(Input[]{L[L]} input, Tax[]{L[L]} taxTable) {
Output{L} out = new Output(input.length);
for (int{L} i=0; i < input.length; i++) {
int{H} lo = 0;
int{H} hi = taxTable.length;
try {
while (lo+1 < hi) {
int{H} mid = (lo + hi) / 2;
if (input[i].taxableIncome
< taxTable[mid].brackets) //no AOB exception
{hi = mid;}
else {lo = mid;};
};
} catch (NullPointerException e){};
if (input[i].maritalStatus)
{ out.updateMarried(i,taxTable[lo].married);}
else
{ out.updateSingle(i,taxTable[lo].single);};
};
return out;
}
}
Fig. 22. The Tax Calculation program.
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the Java Virtual Machine, and to support declassification. As an initial step towards
dealing with concurrency, we have proposed a sound information flow type system for
a concurrent extension of the JVM (Barthe et al., 2010; Barthe and Rivas, 2011); the
extension supports objects, methods, multi-threading and dynamic thread creation, but
not exceptions, locks and synchronization primitives. The extension builds upon Russo
and Sabelfeld (Russo and Sabelfeld, 2006) idea to constrain the behavior of schedulers
so that high branches execute uninterruptedly, thereby avoiding internal timing leaks.
In our setting, the idea of secure scheduler is modeled by making the behavior of the
scheduler depend on the security environment.
The applicability of the type system could be enhanced significantly by considering
more flexible policies that allow some controlled form of information release. In (Barthe
et al., 2008), we show in the setting of the JVMI language how to adapt our type system
so that it provides support for delimited non-disclosure, a specific form of declassification
that enables to declassify the value of a variable at a specified program point. Technically,
the prime difference between (Barthe et al., 2008) and the current work is that the former
considers local policies, i.e. there is a security policy for each program point; it allows the
security level of variables to change during execution, so that variables can be declassified.
The type system that enforces delimited non-disclosure is built systematically from the
baseline type system for non-interference, and we foresee no difficulty in extending the
results of (Barthe et al., 2008) to richer fragments of the JVM.
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